Why Afghanistan–Pakistan Relations Remain Locked in Crisis
On November 6-7, 2025, the third round of internationally mediated peace talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan collapsed in Istanbul, extinguishing hopes that diplomatic engagement could stabilize relations between two neighbors whose disputed border has become a flashpoint for escalating violence. The breakdown came despite intensive mediation by Qatar and Turkey, which had brokered a fragile ceasefire just weeks earlier following October's deadly cross-border clashes that killed combatants on both sides. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif bluntly declared the negotiations "over" with "no plan for future meetings," while Afghan Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid blamed Pakistan's "unreasonable demands." Within days of the diplomatic collapse, two devastating attacks struck Pakistan—first at Cadet College Wana in South Waziristan on November 10, then at Islamabad's District Judicial Complex on November 11—killing at least seventeen people and generating contradictory militant claims that exposed fundamental fractures within Pakistan's insurgency landscape.
This crisis offers insights into the structural constraints that continue to shape Afghanistan-Pakistan relations despite sustained diplomatic engagement. The failure of peace negotiations, the weaponization of economic interdependence through prolonged border closures, the resumption of cross-border violence, and the ineffectiveness of multiple international mediation attempts illustrate the persistence of deep-seated grievances that have plagued bilateral relations for decades: Pakistan's demand that Afghanistan suppress the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating from Afghan territory, Afghanistan's rejection of what it perceives as infringement on its sovereignty, competing claims over the legitimacy of the colonial-era Durand Line, and the growing influence of external actors—particularly India—in Afghanistan's strategic calculations.
Peace Talks in Istanbul
The fragile diplomatic process aimed at stabilizing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan following cross-border clashes which began in October came to an abrupt end in Istanbul during the first week of November 2025. After two earlier rounds of negotiations and a brief ceasefire brokered by Qatar and Turkey in Doha on October 19, the third round of talks collapsed on November 6–7, extinguishing hopes for regional security. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif bluntly declared the negotiations "over" with "no plan for future meetings," while Afghan Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, countered by blaming Pakistan's "unreasonable demands" for the breakdown. The fundamental impasse remained unresolved: Pakistan demands written, verifiable commitments from the Taliban government to dismantle Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sanctuaries operating from Afghan soil, while Afghanistan refuses, maintaining that it cannot guarantee Pakistan's internal security. Although both sides continue to technically observe the ceasefire established in October, neither party shows willingness to return to negotiations.
Pakistan's Non-Negotiable Demands The collapse reflects deep-seated grievances and irreconcilable positions that have characterized Afghanistan-Pakistan relations for decades. Pakistan has consistently maintained that ending cross-border terrorism is the only "non-negotiable" condition for any meaningful dialogue. This position was reinforced dramatically when a Taliban officer publicly threatened suicide bombings inside Pakistan, citing the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as precedent—a statement that Pakistan immediately seized upon as proof of state-tolerated terrorism. The Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded forcefully to this threat, underscoring Islamabad's view that elements within the Afghan Taliban regime actively support or tolerate anti-Pakistan militant groups.
International documentation appears to support Pakistan's core security concerns. A United Nations report corroborated Pakistani claims that TTP operates from Afghan soil with approximately 6,000 fighters, lending credibility to Islamabad's insistence that the Taliban government has failed to curb terrorist sanctuaries within its borders. This assessment formed the backdrop to increasingly pointed Pakistani statements throughout November, culminating in a comprehensive military briefing that laid bare Pakistan's frustration. On November 20, Director General Inter-Services Public Relations, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, delivered a detailed briefing that crystallized Pakistan's position and grievances. Chaudhry accused Afghan forces of deliberately firing on Pakistani border posts to facilitate terrorist infiltration, described a "terror-crime nexus" utilizing smuggled vehicles for attacks, and stated unequivocally that Pakistan had provided "undeniable evidence" of TTP sanctuaries to the Taliban government—evidence that went unaddressed. The ISPR chief emphasized that trade relations could not continue while Pakistan's security remained under threat, signaling that economic leverage might be employed if diplomatic channels remained closed.
Taliban's Red Lines The Taliban government's position, while seemingly unyielding to Pakistani officials, reflects its own complex political calculations and constraints. Afghan Deputy Interior Minister, Rahmatullah Najib, revealed two major red lines that ultimately proved insurmountable during the Istanbul negotiations. First, Kabul offered to repatriate TTP fighters only on the condition that Pakistan recognize them as legitimate political actors rather than terrorists—a concession Islamabad found completely unacceptable. Second, when Pakistan demanded that Afghan religious authorities issue a fatwa declaring jihad inside Pakistan "unlawful," Afghanistan agreed in principle but insisted that any such fatwa must come from Darul Ifta (Islamic council) strictly on Sharia grounds, independent of political pressure—a qualification that Pakistan rejected as insufficient. These conditions reveal the Taliban government's unwillingness to be seen as capitulating to Pakistani demands or compromising its ideological foundations, even at the cost of continued diplomatic isolation and economic hardship.Deterioration: "Periods of Dark Isolation"
Mutual Recriminations and Border Violations The timing and circumstances of the talks' collapse were marked by mutual recriminations and conflicting narratives. On November 6, the very day negotiations were underway in Istanbul, Afghanistan claimed that Pakistani forces fired across the border at Spin Boldak, wounding Afghan civilians—an incident that underscored the fragility of the ceasefire and the absence of trust between the two sides. Following the collapse, Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement characterizing Taliban commitments as mere "hollow promises"- accusing the regime of avoiding their commitments to take verifiable measures to prevent their territory being used to foment terrorism, and of seeking to divert attention from the core issue of cross-border terrorism by raising irrelevant accusations, stoking Pashtun nationalism, and misrepresenting wanted militants as refugees. The Taliban, for its part, once again, blamed "elements in Pakistan's military" for deliberately sabotaging the peace process, suggesting internal Pakistani divisions or hardline factions opposed to any accommodation with the Taliban government.
Tentative Diplomatic Threads Despite the acrimonious end to formal negotiations, some minimal diplomatic contact has been maintained. Embassy-level communication between the two countries continues. Yet even as diplomatic channels remained nominally open, the security situation along the border continued to deteriorate. On November 25, 30 and December 5, cross-border firing in Khost, Kurram district and Spin Boldak erupted once again, highlighting the volatile conditions in Pakistan's border regions and the ease with which localized incidents could escalate into broader confrontations.
Saudi Arabia's Failed Intervention The latest clashes came just days after Saudi-mediated peace talks had failed to produce any breakthrough. Reuters reported that fresh talks had taken place in Saudi Arabia, with three Afghan officials and two Pakistani officials confirmed in attendance. Both sides agreed to maintain the ceasefire but achieved no breakthrough on substantive issues. Pakistan was represented by military, intelligence, and foreign office officials, while Afghanistan expressed openness to "more meetings for a positive outcome." However, Pakistan's Foreign Office denied any knowledge of the talks on December 5, claiming it had no "inkling" of a Saudi meeting—raising questions about civil-military coordination in Islamabad and underscoring how rapidly the security situation could deteriorate in the absence of a functioning diplomatic framework.
Twin Attacks, Competing Claims: Militant Contradictions and State Blame in November 2025
Just days after the collapse of peace talks in Istanbul, Pakistan confronted the violent consequences of diplomatic failure. On November 10, a five-man suicide assault team stormed Cadet College Wana in South Waziristan, killing cadets and staff in a meticulously coordinated attack that bore the hallmarks of sophisticated militant planning. Twenty-four hours later, a suicide bomber detonated outside Islamabad's District Judicial Complex during morning rush hour, killing civilians and security personnel in the heart of the capital. Together, these attacks killed at least seventeen people, but their significance extended far beyond the immediate death toll: the chaotic aftermath exposed fundamental fractures within Pakistan's militant landscape and laid bare the limits of both Pakistani state intelligence and Taliban governance in Afghanistan. The confusion began immediately. A previously unknown group calling itself "Jaish-ul-Hind" claimed responsibility for the Wana assault, while the Islamabad bombing generated contradictory claims from within Jaish-ul-Adl itself—the organization's leader asserting responsibility even as a senior commander publicly denied involvement. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's central leadership disavowed both attacks entirely. This cacophony of claims and counter-claims revealed not organizational strength but fragmentation: multiple militant entities operating with competing objectives, contested chains of command, and an apparent inability to control or even accurately account for violence committed in their names.
Wana: Cadet College In the early hours of November 10, a five-man suicide assault team attempted to storm Cadet College Wana in South Waziristan. The attack began when a suicide bomber detonated a vehicle laden with explosives at the main gate, creating a breach that allowed the remaining attackers to enter the sprawling compound. The blast injured 15 civilians and 4 security personnel. What followed was a prolonged firefight lasting hours as Pakistani security forces engaged the militants who had penetrated the facility. According to security sources, two attackers were quickly killed at the gate, while three others managed to enter the compound before being cornered in an administrative block. During the clearance operation, Pakistan's Inter Services Public Relations agency (ISPR) reported that the militants were in contact with their "masters and handlers in Afghanistan" throughout the assault, receiving real-time instructions. All five attackers were ultimately killed as part of the wider Azm e Istehkam counterterrorism campaign.
Islamabad: Striking the Capital Less than 24 hours after the Wana siege, on November 11, a suicide bomber struck outside the District Judicial Complex in Islamabad—the deadliest attack on Pakistan's capital since 2008. The attacker, whose identity remained unknown in the immediate aftermath, had attempted to enter the court premises but was unable to penetrate the security cordon. According to Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi, CCTV footage showed the man loitering around the courts, waiting for an opportunity. When a police vehicle approached, he detonated his explosives-laden vest next to it. The blast, heard for miles, occurred at one of the busiest times of day, when the complex was crowded with hundreds of litigants, lawyers, and court staff. At least 12 people were killed and 35 injured in the explosion. The bomber's severed head was recovered at the scene—a grim detail that confirmed the suicide nature of the attack. The attack was particularly significant given Islamabad's heavy security infrastructure. The capital requires high-level security clearances to enter and exit, with specific security zones throughout the city. The judicial complex itself is situated in a district filled with high-ranking government offices, approximately 15 kilometers from Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the offices of the president and prime minister.
Competing Claims & Narratives
The Mysterious "Jaish-ul-Hind" Responsibility for the Cadet College Wana attack was claimed by a group calling itself "Jaish-ul-Hind" (Army of India). The attackers themselves repeatedly mentioned this name in videos recorded during the assault. However, "Jaish-ul-Hind" has no known online presence, no social media accounts, and had never issued statements before. Pakistani security officials later revealed what they claimed was the truth: TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud had personally approved the attack but ordered it be claimed under the false "Jaish-ul-Hind" name as a diversionary tactic. According to Pakistani officials, this deception was prompted by Afghan Taliban pressure on TTP not to publicly claim attacks, as such claims create diplomatic problems for Kabul. The TTP itself never officially commented on the Wana attack.
Competing narratives left Pakistani officials, security analysts, and the public struggling to determine who actually carried out the bombing—and whether the confusion itself might have been intentional, serving to obscure accountability and complicate Pakistan's response options.
JuA Leader Claims Responsibility: Jamaat-ul-Ahrar leader Omar Mukkaram Khurasani sent messages to reporters claiming responsibility for the attack. In his statement, he framed the bombing as a deliberate strike against Pakistan's legal system, stating that "judges, lawyers and officials who carried out rulings under Pakistan's un-Islamic laws were targeted." He warned that such attacks would continue until the Pakistani government adopts Sharia law, positioning the strike as part of JuA's broader campaign against secular governance.
JuA Commander Denies & Contradicts: Yet shortly after Khurasani's claim, Sarbakaf Mohmand, an influential JuA commander, sent WhatsApp messages to reporters insisting the group had not made any such claim. Mohmand's denial wasn't merely a clarification or caveat, it was a flat contradiction of his own leader's statement. This public split between JuA's leadership and a senior field commander revealed a command structure in disarray. Mohmand is not a minor figure; he's described as an "influential commander" with his own operational authority and communication channels. His decision to publicly contradict Khurasani within hours suggests either a fundamental breakdown in internal coordination or an active power struggle over who speaks for JuA. The internal dynamics within JuA help explain this fracture. Both Khurasani and Mohmand were reportedly demoted at a January 2025 TTP Central Shura meeting in the presence of TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud.
TTP Central Denies: Compounding the confusion, TTP spokesman Muhammad Khurasani officially stated: "The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has no connection with the explosion that took place at the Islamabad courts on November 11, 2025." This denial came despite JuA's historical position as a TTP splinter faction and recent merger announcements.
State Responses: Framing the Narrative
Pakistan moved swiftly to cut through the militant groups' contradictory claims and establish a clear chain of culpability leading to Afghanistan and India.
Arrests and Afghan Nationals On November 14, seven arrests were made in Rawalpindi in connection with the Islamabad bombing, with the Counter-Terrorism Department conducting raids across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi claimed both attackers were Afghan nationals, with evidence shared with Afghan authorities. Pakistani security officials alleged all five Wana attackers were Afghan citizens using equipment—including American-made weapons—provided from Afghanistan.
Unmasking "Jaish-ul-Hind" Pakistan's Information Ministry revealed what it called the truth behind "Jaish-ul-Hind": TTP chief Noor Wali Mehsud had personally approved the Wana attack but ordered it claimed under a false name. According to officials, "The Afghan Taliban pressure Fitna al-Khawarij not to accept responsibility of attacks as that leads to pressure from Pakistan and friendly countries."
India Accusation Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif blamed India for both attacks: "Khawarij, active on Indian instigation from Afghanistan, also attacked innocent children in Wana... Both attacks are the worst examples of Indian state terrorism in the region." The ISPR accused militants of belonging to "Indian proxy, Fitna al-Khawarij," with handlers in Afghanistan providing real-time instructions during the Wana siege. Pakistan's Information Ministry alleged the attacks aimed to "increase security concerns in Pakistan, on demand of the Indian agency RAW." Pakistan's use of Fitna al-Khawarij,referencing an extremist sect from early Islamic history, represents deliberate theological delegitimization. This rebranding began in June 2024.
A Brief Expression of Regret—Nothing More The Taliban government offered almost no substantive response to either the attacks or Pakistan's escalating accusations. The Afghan Taliban expressed "deep regret and sorrow" over both attacks in a brief statement. This non-engagement continues Afghanistan's consistent denial that it provides TTP shelter or allows the group to operate from Afghan soil—a position maintained through silence rather than active rebuttal. Afghanistan's refusal to address Pakistan's accusations risked triggering renewed military action. Within two weeks, Pakistan allegedly conducted renewed airstrikes in Khost, Afghanistan, which Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid claimed killed nine children and a woman in a civilian home.
Economic Warfare: Border Closures and Trade Collapse
The Cost of Closure While diplomatic and military tensions dominated headlines, the economic dimension of the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis proved equally devastating and potentially more consequential for the long-term trajectory of bilateral relations. The Torkham and Chaman border crossings remained closed throughout November—exceeding 50 days since the October 12 shutdown—strangling $2 billion in annual bilateral trade and inflicting severe economic pain on both sides of the border. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Joint Chamber of Commerce reported losses exceeding $100 million, with 8,000 containers blocked in Pakistan and 4,000 stranded in Afghanistan.
Ripple Effects Across Both Economies The economic impact extended far beyond the immediate losses at the border crossings. Afghanistan's crucial imports from Pakistan, including cement, medicine, and agricultural products, halted entirely, while the suspension of Afghan coal imports caused local Pakistani coal prices to spike from Rs30-32,000 to Rs42-45,000 per tonne, a nearly 40 percent increase that rippled through Pakistan's energy sector and industrial production. On November 1, Torkham briefly reopened specifically for Afghan refugees, continuing Pakistan's policy of using refugee repatriation as political leverage while keeping commercial traffic blocked. Pakistan simultaneously intensified its Afghan migrant crackdown following clashes, intensifying pressure on the Taliban regime through demographic displacement—a tactic that added a humanitarian dimension to the economic warfare.
Afghanistan's Strategic Pivot By mid-November, the Taliban Government began actively seeking alternatives to its economic dependence on Pakistan. On November 12-13, Afghan Deputy Prime Minister, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, ordered, traders to reduce, and in some cases banned, reliance on Pakistani goods, encouraging alternative trade routes throughout Central Asia, including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, explicitly citing repeated border closures as "political blackmail." This marked a significant strategic shift in Afghanistan's economic orientation, one with potentially lasting consequences for regional trade patterns; a strategic reorientation reflected in talks with Tajikistan this month, aimed at diversifying trade partnerships. Trade with Iran via Chabahar has also expanded, already surging past $1.6 billion in six months, eclipsing Pakistan trade volumes and demonstrating the viability of alternative routes. Despite Afghanistan's pivot, Pakistan's Deputy Minister maintained that trade expansion in Central Asia and Iran posed no detriment to Pakistani interests, a statement that seemed to underestimate the long-term strategic implications of Afghanistan's economic reorientation. This comes particularly in light of Pakistan's halting of joint projects with Afghanistan, including TAPI, CASA-1000, and the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan railway, dependent on Afghanistan's conviction in meeting Pakistan's security concerns.
Human Cost and Business Backlash The human cost of the prolonged border closure manifested in protests and formal complaints from those most directly affected. Drivers in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa staged protests against the prolonged border closure in Torkham, highlighting how the standoff between governments translated into lost livelihoods for ordinary workers dependent on cross-border commerce. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry submitted a formal protest letter to Pakistani authorities demanding resolution of the crisis, reflecting the business community's growing frustration with the subordination of economic interests to security concerns.
Pakistan's Policy Shift Pakistan's approach to the border closure reflected a policy shift announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that their "threshold of patience" had been crossed, and Pakistan was reversing its previous policy of segregating trade and security concerns with Afghanistan. Despite economic loss, they justified keeping borders closed by citing risks of attacks on border posts, stating that trade remained suspended to reduce the risk of loss of life. This linkage of economic and security issues represented a departure from earlier approaches that had attempted to maintain commercial relations even during periods of heightened security tensions. However, on November 27, Pakistan announced it would imminently open border crossings at Torkham and Chaman to allow UN humanitarian aid through, suggesting selective reopening rather than full normalization—an approach likely designed to demonstrate that Pakistan was not seeking to inflict collective punishment on Afghan civilians while maintaining pressure on the Taliban government.
India's Growing Role The trade collapse opened opportunities for other regional players seeking to expand their influence in Afghanistan. India boosted trade relations with Afghanistan's commerce and industry minister Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi amid the Pakistan trade blockade, positioning itself as an alternative economic partner and potentially complicating Pakistan's strategic calculations. Though Pakistan has stated that they are not officially concerned with increasing trade relations between the two nations, the deepening relationship prompted increasingly paranoid responses from Pakistani officials. Defense Minister, Khawaja Asif, went so far as to claim that India wants to keep Pakistan busy in a "two-front war" by encouraging the Taliban to support terrorism from Afghan soil, accusing India of sponsoring militant activities against Pakistan. The Taliban government has rejected these accusations, while simultaneously defending India, stating that Pakistan was attempting to shift blame on to the two nations for their own internal security problems.
International Reactions
The deteriorating security situation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in November prompted responses from regional powers and international organizations, though the efficacy of external mediation remained limited. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan welcomed Pakistan's decision to allow humanitarian supplies to cross the border, while Deputy Special Representative Georgette Gagnon urged both parties to address core issues and respect the ceasefire. At a Security Council briefing, Pakistan's UN Ambassador Asim Iftikhar Ahmad warned that Islamabad would take necessary defense measures if the Taliban failed to act against militants allegedly operating from Afghan soil, requesting that UNAMA provide an objective assessment of the border security situation.
China, with significant economic interests at stake through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, expressed deep concern over the conflict and called on both countries to exercise calm and restraint while resolving concerns through dialogue. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun emphasized that as inseparable neighbors, maintaining good relations served the fundamental interests of both sides. Following the November clashes, China reiterated its readiness to play a constructive role in improving bilateral ties, though analysts noted Beijing's limited leverage to effect meaningful change.
Turkey and Qatar, having brokered the initial ceasefire in October, continued their mediation efforts through the Istanbul talks in early November. Pakistan's Foreign Ministry acknowledged the sincere efforts of these brotherly states while expressing disappointment that the Taliban regime avoided concrete action. Following the collapse of the Istanbul talks, both mediators maintained contact with the parties, though no immediate breakthrough emerged.
Russia offered to facilitate negotiations between Pakistan and the Taliban, a proposal Islamabad received positively as another indication that regional security required collaborative approaches. Moscow's intervention reflected broader regional concerns about instability along Afghanistan's borders.
The United States maintained a more distant posture, with President Trump stating he would resolve the conflict "very quickly" but offering few specific mechanisms. The Trump administration's suspension of immigration processing for Afghan nationals following a November security incident in Washington complicated the diplomatic landscape, though this decision was driven primarily by domestic security concerns rather than the Pakistan-Afghanistan crisis itself.
The confluence of mediation offers from multiple powers underscored both the regional significance of the conflict and the limits of external pressure. Despite international calls for restraint and dialogue, the fundamental disagreements between Islamabad and Kabul—particularly regarding TTP sanctuaries and the legitimacy of the Durand Line—remained unresolved, suggesting that external mediation alone could not bridge the structural divide between the two neighbors.
The Path Forward: An Intractable Impasse
The collapse of the Istanbul talks represents more than just another failed diplomatic initiative in the troubled history of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. It highlights the fundamental incompatibility between Pakistan's security imperatives and Afghanistan's refusal to be perceived as subordinate to its eastern neighbor. Pakistan faces genuine security threats from the TTP and other militant groups operating from Afghan territory, threats that have resulted in hundreds of casualties among Pakistani security forces and civilians in recent years. Yet Afghanistan, having emerged from decades of foreign occupation and intervention, is deeply resistant to external demands that it views as infringing on its sovereignty or requiring it to act as Pakistan's security guarantor.
The addition of economic warfare to the diplomatic and military dimensions of the conflict has created a multifaceted crisis with no clear resolution pathway. Pakistan's use of border closures as leverage has inflicted significant economic pain on Afghanistan, but it has also accelerated Afghanistan's strategic pivot toward alternative trade routes and partners—a development that may ultimately diminish Pakistan's long-term influence over its neighbor. The Taliban government's retaliatory measures, particularly import bans on Pakistani goods, including vital imports such as pharmaceuticals, demonstrate a willingness to absorb short-term economic and humanitarian costs in order to resist what it perceives as Pakistani coercion.
The regional implications of this breakdown are significant. Without a functioning diplomatic mechanism to address cross-border terrorism, the risk of escalation—whether through continued militant attacks, Pakistani military responses and Taliban retaliation—remains high. The December clashes at Spin Boldak demonstrated how, to the present day, peace talks and technical continuation of a ceasefire offers little protection when underlying political and military disputes remain unresolved. International mediators, including Qatar, Turkey, and most recently Saudi Arabia, appear to have limited influence over parties whose positions have become increasingly entrenched. The United Nations and other international bodies, while able to document the security situation, lack the leverage to compel meaningful concessions from either side.
As both countries navigate this impasse, the human cost continues to mount. Pakistani and Afghan communities near the border live under the constant threat of militant attacks, cross-fire from cross-border disputes and an ever worsening economic picture. The dreams of cross-border trade, economic integration, and regional stability that briefly seemed possible during the Doha ceasefire and previous months of positive diplomatic progress have given way to familiar patterns of mutual suspicion, accusations, and military posturing.

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