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From October 11th-13th, 2024, thousands of Pashtuns—the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan—converged in Jamrud in District Khyber, one of the merged districts in the northwestern border of Pakistan with Afghanistan. The gathering was dubbed as the ‘Pashtun Qaumi (National) Jirga’ or the Pashtun Adalat (Court) which was organized by the Pashtun Tahaffuz (Protection) Movement (PTM), a grassroots human rights movement advocating for Pashtuns since its formation in 2018. The Pashtun Qaumi Jirga was called in the aftermath of the tragic killing of the poet-activist, Gilaman Wazir—a staunch critic of the Pakistani Armed forces and dedicated supporter of the Afghan people and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (not to be confused with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan).

The analysis of the jirga explores how perception—not just narrative—has become a political battlefield in Pakistan’s Pashtun borderlands, with the PTM, Pakistani state, and militant groups all vying to control public imagination. The resulting noise often obscures local grievances and fosters a politics of symbolic performance over substantive transformation. To contextualize this struggle, it is necessary to trace the rise of the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement. Its origins lie in the displacement of the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan and the subsequent stigmatization of their identity and racial profiling along with deprivation of basic human rights which initially led to the formation of Mehsud Tahaffuz Movement (MTM) in 2014 by a group of students in Gomal University while displaced from their home(lands).

The movement demanded the removal of landmines from the Waziristan territory, to cease systematic discrimination, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of Mehsud tribesmen. However, even before MTM, there existed ‘Khat Tehreek’ (Shirt Movement) that was launched by a renowned Mehsud journalist and one of the most prolific frontline reporters on the militancy and War of Terror in the Pashtun borderlands, Sailab Mahsud, to preserve Pashtun values. The movement raised slogans such as ‘Da Sanga Azaadi Da’ (What Kind of Freedom is This) and ‘Pakhtun Ta Zwandon Ghawaro’ (We Want Life for Pashtun) to awaken Pashtun nationalism.

Under the leadership of Manzoor Pashteen, a young Mehsud tribesman, Khat Tehreek evolved into the Mahsud Tahaffuz Movement (MTM) which had broader claims than those of the Khat Tehreek. MTM coalesced into the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) rallying ethnic Pashtuns from all the tribal areas demanding the creation of a ‘truth and reconciliation’ committee for those affected by the conflict in the tribal areas. PTM relied on ‘protest movements’ and ‘marches’ to gain traction for its anti-Army narrative and became increasingly embroiled in a political confrontation with the State (i.e., Pakistan Army). Overtime, PTM was dubbed as the ‘movement of the Pashtun millennials’ or ‘Pashtun Spring’. However, within months in 2018, the Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies began a crackdown on the resisting PTM youth and leaders by labelling them as ‘anti-state’ and working on the agenda of enemy countries (i.e., India and Afghanistan). Similarly, ahead of the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga, the government imposed a ban on the PTM under the Pakistan’s Anti-Terrorism Act, citing threats to national peace and security, and attempted to forcibly remove supporters from the jirga site, resulting in at least three reported fatalities. Nevertheless, thousands attended the jirga, elucidating the grievances and collective aspirations of the Pashtuns.

This article presents the argument that the broader significance of the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga lies in the battle of perceptions it reflects—a contest not just over narratives, but how they are received, internalized, and acted upon by Pashtuns, the state, and the international community. This article is primarily based on fieldwork, observations and interviews at the Jirga examining how PTM navigates the politics of perception, emphasizing the interplay between its dual messaging, the state’s response, and the socio-political realities of the Pashtun borderlands.

The Jirga gathering was organized over four hundred acres where the Afridi tribe – the main tribe that inhabits District Khyber—were declared the hosts. The setting included over eighty camps each representing a district in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Pashtun-populated districts in Balochistan marking a slight departure from traditional tribal jirgas, where representation is rooted in clan affiliations, signaling a move toward a broader, more inclusive Pashtun unity. Previously, the ‘Bannu Jirga’ had been organized by the Pashtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) between 11–14 March 2022, which was also dubbed as the ‘Pashtun National Jirga’, in order to defend the rights of the Pashtuns in the country.

In the Jamrud Jirga, the young Afridi tribesmen, easily recognizable in their red shirts, were a prominent presence as they served as volunteers managing the event and providing security. Despite the high-security alert, their only visible weapons were long wooden sticks, adding a striking contrast to the tense atmosphere. It was also interesting to note that many camps prominently displayed photographs of ‘missing persons’ from their districts, with some noting the duration of their disappearance—often spanning over a decade. Another particularly notable observation was Afridi volunteers expelling other young men who were carrying or draping the Afghan flag (Islamic Republic, not Emirate), underscoring the gathering’s sensitive political dynamics and the volunteers’ efforts to maintain order. Moreover, I was corrected by numerous participants of the gathering when I referred to the jirga as ‘PTM jirga’ who instead urged me to call it the ‘Pashtun Jirga’ reasoning that it was for all Pashtuns regardless of their views and affiliations with PTM.

On the last day of the Qaumi Jirga, a two-hour documentary was screened that highlighted the devastating impact of violence and displacement in the northwestern province. According to the documentary, at least 76,584 people from KP have been killed in bombings, shootings and other attacks over the years, while an estimated 6,700 others remain missing. Manzoor Pashteen, the leader of PTM thereafter presented the decisions of the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga which were based on input from each camp at the Jirga.

The Jirga concluded with twenty-two demands, many of which not only called for reversing the provincial merger but also sought to reshape the administrative and socio-political dynamics of the Pashtun borderlands, reminiscent of the British colonial era. These included a two-month ultimatum for militant groups and Pakistani armed forces and intelligence agencies to vacate the militancy-affected areas. The demands also called for ownership of land and resources, as well as contribution from all districts towards forming a Lashkar (militia) for the protection of Pashtun areas and interests. Economic demands included reducing the electricity tariff in KP to 5 Pakistani rupees per unit from the current rate exceeding 60 rupees, and ensuring KP receives its fair share of natural gas and water. The Jirga also demanded visa-free trade across the Durand Line (from Chaman to Dir).

Legal measures included the threat of legal action against land grabbers occupying the properties of martyrs and missing persons. Additionally, they called for closing military courts and internment camps, release of all political prisoners, and establishment of a judicial commission to investigate extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. On social issues, the Jirga urged the Afghan Taliban (Islamic Emirate) to allow women access to education. They also demanded sending a peace delegation to resolve the conflict in District Kurram and ensuring that internally displaced persons (IDPs) return home without facing extortion.

The Jirga also decided to construct a ‘Jirga Secretariat’ at its site in Jamrud. Manzoor Pashteen concluded his address by stating that if the demands were not implemented within the next two months, the Jirga would seek ‘other’ solutions while not explicating what he meant by ‘other’.

The women’s camp at the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga offered a complex, and disheartening, insight into the dynamics of representation. It was situated next to the main camp which housed the PTM leadership, political elites of different parties within KP, and certain prominent tribal elders. In comparison to the men, the participation of women was negligible. While a few prominent women activists belonging to PTM only—mostly journalists from settled districts—were present, their participation seemed more symbolic than substantive. Some of them were dressed in traditional Waziristan attire to attract media attention, openly admitting that portraying themselves as women from tribal areas would lend greater legitimacy to the Jirga. I repeatedly inquired about the possibility of discussing women’s grievances to consolidate their input for the main Jirga committee, but the responses were disappointing. The camp seemed preoccupied with other activities, such as filming social media reels and consuming meals.

The breaking point came when the most animated discussion in the camp centered not on pressing issues but on a photograph—specifically, who would stand closest to Manzoor Pashteen for the shot. My frustration led to my (in)voluntary dismissal from the camp into the larger male-dominated crowd, a move that felt emblematic of PTM's understanding of ‘Tahaffuz’ (protection).

Despite apologies from Pashtun friends over my treatment by PTM’s so-called ‘TikTok activists’, my disillusionment ran deeper. There was no substantive discussion on the real grievances of women in the borderlands. The demands put forth by the Jirga called on the Afghan government to allow girls access to education but failed to acknowledge the decrepit state of education in Waziristan and other merged districts. The recent burning of schools by militants in Waziristan, Kurram, Bajaur, and Bannu went unmentioned. Nor was there any acknowledgment of the systemic challenges that women face in the merged districts such as forced underage marriages, rampant domestic violence, murders in the name of ‘honor’, or the psychological toll of displacement and militancy. Even the horrific reports of transactional sex and rapes in displacement camps like Bakka Khel in Bannu, allegedly by security forces, established for IDPs from North Waziristan, merited no attention? This glaring omission from individuals who claimed to be activists underscored a troubling gap between performative advocacy and genuine engagement with the lived realities of Pashtun women. The superficial advocacy of PTM’s ‘TikTok activists,’ who positioned themselves as guardians of women’s rights in the Pashtun borderlands, was perhaps the most troubling takeaway from my experience.

This superficiality reinforces state perceptions of PTM as a movement focused on visibility over addressing systemic grievances. Yet, such critiques must be situated within a broader context. PTM has seen courageous women leaders emerge, including Wranga Luni and members of the families of missing persons, who have continually risked their safety to protest state violence. These voices challenge both state repression and internal patriarchal dynamics. However, the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga’s framing failed to amplify them, choosing instead a safer route of selective and symbolic acknowledgment.

In the contested Pashtun borderlands, perception is a pivotal battleground; however, it is not accorded the analytical attention it merits but rather understood interchangeably with narrative(s). PTM’s strategic use of social media amplifies its grievances and sacrifices, projecting a grassroots struggle against oppression by the Pakistan Army to global audiences. This digital engagement has largely shaped the perceptions of PTM as a people’s movement advocating for justice. It has especially accorded Manzoor Pashteen the place within Pashtuns as ‘Bacha Khan 2.0’.

Abdul Ghaffar Khan, better known as ‘Bacha Khan’ or the ‘Frontier Gandhi’, also led a nonviolence campaign for greater rights for his fellow Pashtuns in the British Raj in the early 20th century. Conversely, the state’s counter-narrative emphasizes development initiatives, sacrifices of the armed forces, reduced militancy, and accusations of foreign funding to delegitimize PTM. However, the state’s (counter-)narrative has struggled to resonate with local perceptions. For instance, in 2018, when Mehsud Tahhafuz Movement was rebranded and reorganized to form PTM, the Pakistan Army had launched ‘Pakistan Zindabad Movement’ as a counter-movement to PTM justifying that the Pashtun movement was working against security forces. Based on my research, while the Army/ state has denied these claims, the pro-Army rallies by PZM gained coverage in the news though the movement failed to gain legitimacy with locals and reportedly became inactive. However, interestingly enough, it reared its head again to organize a rally against the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)—in Peshawar and Loralai—BLA, an armed resistance against the state is also designated as a terrorist group.

While the war of narratives has continued for years, the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga elucidated this contested nature of perception in the borderland politics by demonstrating the inherently cyclic relationship between narratives and perception. The dismissiveness of the state towards the data shared in the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga and the counter-narrative(s) circulating on mainstream and social media in the aftermath of the gathering help make a case in favour of this argument. Some of the popular circulating messages in WhatsApp groups and social media platforms included “State’s Development and Peace Restoration Initiatives and the Propaganda of the Banned PTM,” “Dreamers of a Greater Afghanistan are Fools or Damn Fools,” “The Future of Afghanistan - Ethnic Division”, “The Solution for Global peace,” “The Figures Presented at the Banned PTM’s Jirga are a Bundle of Lies,” “Banned PTM’s Allegations and the Facts,” and “Caution in Sharing Data and the Need for Research to Defend It Tomorrow.” These narratives had some common running themes: (i) Pakistani Armed forces have made a lot of sacrifices and incomparable contribution to the development and peace of merged districts, (ii) PTM is working on a foreign agenda to destabilize Pakistan and the data shared by PTM in the Jirga was false and contentious, and (iii) Afghanistan wants Pakistan to disintegrate hence the call of ‘Afghan Pashtuns’ for Pashtunistan. To illustrate the counter-narratives to the claims of PTM further, for instance, the text of the lengthy message titled, “Banned PTM’s Allegations and the Facts” read as follows:

The outright dismissal of the claims presented by PTM in the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga were considerably less concerning in comparison to the parallels drawn between PTM and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—the banned lethal militant organization operating in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Tension grew considerably when TTP announced a ceasefire during the duration of the Pashtun Jirga further fanning the allegations that PTM was the political wing of TTP. These contentions had been echoed previously due to PTM’s lack of criticism towards the militant group and its activities—a move that’s easily understandable since it guarantees the security of PTM leadership from militant attacks as reported by PTM officials. Nonetheless, the criticism of the state is somewhat merited as the information provided in the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga was stylized to prevent laying any blame of the atrocities on the militant groups whereas PTM did not remotely hold back when criticizing the Pakistan Army.

For instance, Manzoor Pashteen shared that 1,738 tribal elders had been targeted and killed in the tribal areas but failed to mention who had targeted and killed them. It is an open secret that Hafiz Gul Bahadur group has established control in North Waziristan while TTP is more firmly established in South Waziristan while extending its writ in the North as well. Several of the beheadings and targeted killings in the past couple of years, especially post Operation Zarb-e-Azb, have been linked to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group in North Waziristan. However, PTM did not attribute any of the damages and atrocities to the militant groups operating openly, especially in the southern districts of KP. Some individuals at the Jirga attested to this notion of the lack of blame by PTM towards militants and admitted that it demoralizes the police force and armed forces. This rhetorical ambiguity aligns with TTP’s strategy of (re)framing its militancy as a defense of Pashtun identity, which has co-opted Pashtun nationalism under Noor Wali Mehsud—its current Emir (leader)—creating a convergence of narratives, and perceptions, that risks undermining state efforts for integration and stability in the tribal regions. Additionally, PTM’s rhetorical ambiguity may safeguard its leadership from militant backlash, but it risks eroding trust among Pashtuns who reject militancy and undermines its credibility in international forums as a legitimate rights movement.

Among the undercurrents shaping PTM’s ideological terrain is the revival—though often indirect—of the Pashtunistan imaginary. Pashtun nationalism or the discourse over ‘Pashtunistan’ has been frequently synonymized with social polarization, referring to the intensification of identity-based divisions that reinforce distrust between Pashtuns and the state, and cast legitimate political claims as existential threats to national unity. The idea of Pashtunistan refers to the historical and contested notion of a separate homeland for the Pashtun ethnic group, encompassing regions in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. More clearly, it refers to a geographical entity that would include areas such as Attock, KP, southern KP (i.e., Baluchistan), Chitral, Swat and Afghanistan.

The idea of Pashtunistan symbolizes the aspirations of some Pashtuns for political autonomy and cultural unity which was unfairly disrupted due to the legacy of British colonial rule as the British demarcated the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan—the Durand Line in 1893. The border has been the source of contention as Afghanistan has historically claimed the Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan as part of ‘Pashtunistan,’ Pakistan views the demand as a threat to its territorial integrity. The claims and aspirations of PTM, for Pashtun nationalism and not necessarily Pashtunistan, bear uncanny resemblance to the ideas of the Pashtun nationalist leader Bacha Khan with whom Pashteen is also often compared. Days prior to the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga, the social media platforms were flooded with images of the ‘Pashtunistan Passport’ (see Image 2)—allegedly from Afghan accounts, which further contended that the ‘green passport’ (i.e., the Pakistani Passport) was about to end and be replaced. In my discussions at the Jirga at Jamrud, the Pashtuns from Pakistan vociferously denied supporting the idea of ‘Pashtunistan’ or the disintegration of Pakistan. To many of them, Pashtunistan remains a symbolic and ideational aspiration.

However, in the current scenario, with TTP reorganizing and reframing its narrative, and the ascension of Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, the perception over Pashtunistan has become increasingly contentious. Albeit independent, TTP has risen following the design of Afghan Taliban and shares decades of strategic cooperation and ideological alliance. In my discussions with experts and some locals from merged districts, the alarming concern is the formation of the ‘Islamic State of Pashtunistan’ – the merger of Pashtun movement and TTP. These concerns are echoed keeping in the direction of the perceptions in the Pashtun border areas as the fight for Pashtun rights is being embroiled with the destructive agenda of militancy. The convergence of PTM’s rhetoric and TTP’s new ideological posture is carving space for a complex landscape, where ethnic grievances are being weaponized by militants who otherwise have vastly different objectives.

In his concluding address at Pashtun Qaumi Jirga, Manzoor Pashteen gave the state two months to address the demands put forth by the Jirga. The deadline came and passed. There was no acknowledgement of the deadline from the state or PTM, except for some troll accounts on social media and news outlets attacking PTM and its leadership. As soon as the jirga concluded, there was a broad understanding that the demands of the Jirga were quite unreasonable, and the state was never going to agree. While the PTM leadership has been criticized frequently for casting deliberate ambiguity over its strategic aims, Pashteen announced ‘Aman Pasoon’ (peace uprising) all over Pakistan on the second day after the conclusion of the Pashtun Qaumi Jirga. It is important to note that the Pashtuns had been holding gatherings to protest the rising militancy and re-Talibanization in KP and especially the border districts for the last couple of years. Before the PTM organized the Pashtun National Jirga, the Ulasi Pasoon (public uprising) had become the new face of Pashtun resistance to rising militancy in KP. The Ulasi Pasoon was a conglomeration of the main political parties and rights organizations in KP, including PTM, Awami National Party, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, Pakistan People’s Party, Jamaat-e-Islami and National Democratic Movement, etc. The leaders and participants of the Ulasi Pasoon urged the government and law enforcing agencies to take practical measures for restoration of lasting peace and an end to incidents of target-killing, extortion, lawlessness, kidnapping for ransom and other social crimes in the merged districts. In North Waziristan, in particular, the Utmanzai Jirga—named after the main tribe, ‘Utmanzai’—had been (re)mobilizing and protesting for over two years for peace.They resorted to boycotting polio vaccination drives, cutting off of the gas pipeline being supplied to Punjab rather than KP, holding protest rallies, etc. all in the name of peace.

The introduction of the term ‘pasoon’ (uprising) has been rather recent in the Pashtun resistance to militancy and deteriorating law and order situation in the Pashtun borderland. The Pashtun Qaumi Jirga and the Pashtun ‘pasoon’ (Ulasi and Aman, both) merit a closer inspection of the Pashtun generation that is at the forefront of the resistance. It is also important to underscore that the Pashtun millennials are the first Pashtun generation that is experiencing the highly connected globality due to technology, internet access, prolonged displacement, social media, etc. without the restrictions of the Frontier Crimes Regulations— a British colonial-era law that governed the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) through collective punishment until its repeal in 2018. More importantly, this Pashtun generation has consciously witnessed and lived through the US-led War of Terror where the Pashtun borderlands constituted a critical juncture. Their aspirations and determination for peace were almost palpable at the Qaumi Jirga. Outright dismissal by the state and Pakistan Army of the atrocities that the Pashtun have suffered will only increase the social polarization which has already reached critical levels. And in this scenario, it’s understandable that by positioning itself as the voice of the oppressed, PTM appeals to a shared Pashtun moral consciousness. For PTM, the challenge lies in moving beyond the morality of grievance to articulate a constructive political agenda that empowers Pashtuns as agents of change.

The politics of perception in the Pashtun borderlands has far-reaching implications for governance, identity, and resistance. PTM’s dual messaging, while inclusive, risks creating ambiguities that alienate certain groups. Similarly, its demands for demilitarization and justice, while widely supported, face practical and political obstacles, limiting their potential to translate into tangible change. This cyclical interplay between the narrative (PTM’s grievances) and perception (victimization of Pashtuns) creates a self-reinforcing dynamic where both sides escalate their messaging, further polarizing the discourse. Breaking the cycle of contested narratives and perceptions is essential to building sustainable peace in the Pashtun borderlands, by fostering inclusive dialogue and addressing underlying grievances hat fuel these perceptions, the region can move toward stability and reconciliation. Some suggestions for policy interventions are detailed below:

1. The Pakistani state should engage directly with PTM and local Pashtun communities through transparent platforms that co-construct narratives and allow independent investigations into grievances like enforced disappearances to rebuild public trust.

2. To disrupt cycles of exclusion, the federal and provincial governments must replace top-down messaging with reciprocal communication by regularly consulting local stakeholders and integrating their feedback into policy decisions.

3. The provincial government and civil society organizations should promote independent Pashtun media outlets that critically assess both state and PTM narratives, helping to depolarize the information landscape in the border regions.

4. The Pakistan Army should publicly acknowledge past failures, including the impact of re-Talibanization, to signal sincerity and rebuild legitimacy among affected communities and PTM supporters.

5. The state, particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Planning Division, should reframe the Durand Line as a bridge for cultural and economic exchange by investing in cross-border infrastructure that benefits borderland Pashtun communities.

6. The provincial and local governments must support Pashtun women and community leaders by promoting their inclusion in leadership roles and highlighting local success stories that counter narratives of victimhood.

7. The state and civil society actors should implement early-warning mechanisms based on local perceptions to help security agencies and policymakers anticipate and de-escalate potential flashpoints before they evolve into broader conflicts.

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