Days after the United States struck Iran's nuclear facilities, President Trump's disavowal of regime change in Tehran—while ostensibly positive—has done little to bridge the profound trust deficit between Washington and Tehran.  If anything, Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian, have dubbed the United States an untrustworthy player and negotiator. This can be attributed to two reasons: first, the level of inter-state distrust is high; second, the Trump administration has not formally renounced regime change as a policy option. 

A more formal U.S. renunciation of regime change in Iran, however, can be advantageous for both the United States and China — a major strategic actor in the region. It can contribute to reviving direct nuclear talks between the two countries. More importantly for the Trump administration, it can help prevent the outbreak of a long and costly war involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. For China, U.S. abandonment of regime change would be a source of economic and geopolitical stability. 

Washington’s  policy approach toward regime change in Tehran—whether explicit or implicit—has consequences for South Asia as well, not least India and Pakistan. Iran’s internal stability is not a peripheral concern but a core strategic variable. Both countries maintain long-standing yet challenging ties with Tehran, shaped by geographic proximity, economic interests, energy needs, and geopolitical calculations.

A categorical U.S. dismissal of regime change as a policy option against Iran will help advance two of Trump’s key objectives: ensuring that Iran does not build nuclear weapons and that Washington does not get embroiled in a prolonged war in the Middle East. If the defiant Iranian leadership is assured that the Islamic Republic will survive, it might give nuclear diplomacy another chance. This is primarily because such an assurance would signal that the U.S. is only concerned with curtailing Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. In other words, if the U.S. puts regime change off the table, Iran’s sovereignty-related concerns would be reduced, creating an enabling environment for dialogue. 

Regime-threatening statements and actions will, however, force Iran to abandon diplomacy and accelerate its nuclear program. Such an eventuality would open the pathway to Iran’s nuclear weaponization. These fears cannot be ignored, especially when Iran still has 400 kg of unmonitored highly enriched uranium. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that U.S. strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities did not significantly degrade the country's ability to build nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities did not significantly degrade the country’s ability to build nuclear weapons. So, if the regime feels that its survival is at stake, it might see nuclear weapons as its best source of security and deterrence. However, U.S. assurances and reassurances about regime survival would obviate this principal concern. 

The absence of an existential threat to the regime would also reduce the likelihood of an all-out war in the Middle East. Regime security would mitigate pressures on Iran to quickly revitalize its now-disintegrated Axis of Resistance — a network of Iranian proxies in the Middle East. Moreover, it would reduce Iran’s incentives to take preemptive measures, including the targeting of U.S. military installations. 

On the contrary, if Iran’s behavior during the 12-day conflict is any indication, Tehran would work to neutralize any perceived threats to its survival. A regime consumed by fears of its own collapse could end up harming both Israel and the U.S., increasing the risk of the protracted war Trump has sought to avoid.

Washington’s assurances of the regime’s survival would also be welcomed in Beijing, where ties with the Islamic Republic are rapidly deepening into a strategic partnership. Since 2016, both countries have bolstered their relations, particularly after signing a US$400 billion, 25-year strategic partnership in 2021. This agreement has formalized and deepened Iran’s involvement in China’s all-important Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This development is hardly surprising, as Iran has long been viewed as a pivotal state and critical supply conduit in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Moreover, Iran has also become a major oil supplier for China, as evidenced by growing Chinese imports from the country. Between June 1 and 20, 2025, Chinese imports of Iranian crude soared to a record 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd), marking a nearly 50% increase over the 2024 average. In recent years, both countries have also strengthened their diplomatic ties. China’s mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Iran’s induction as a full member of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) suggest a growing level of diplomatic convergence between the two. 

Against this backdrop, if the Islamic Republic is left to fend for itself and becomes embroiled in an attritional conflict with the U.S., China’s overland and maritime access to West Asia, Africa, and Europe could face significant disruption. More significantly, if tensions escalate into open conflict, China’s oil supplies would face serious disruptions. These effects would be magnified if Iran moved to block the Strait of Hormuz: Heavily dependent on the Strait for its oil imports, China would suffer immensely from its blockade. In 2024, approximately 84% of crude oil and 83% of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) transiting the Strait was destined for Asian markets, with China, India, Japan, and South Korea together accounting for about 69% of crude flows. An Iran less concerned about regime collapse, by contrast, would likely continue deepening its partnership with China, enabling Beijing to consolidate strategic inroads across the Middle East.

A stable Islamic Republic would also favor Pakistan— a country that has come a long way with Iran since engaging in direct military hostilities in January 2024. This is evidenced by Pakistan’s strong diplomatic support for Iran during the 12-day Iran-Israel war. The recently concluded official visit to Pakistan by Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian, also speaks to the growing momentum in bilateral relations. According to Pezeshkian, the visit was aimed at improving trade and border security between the two countries. These developments underscore a mutual commitment to broadening and deepening ties, and therefore, the stability of the Islamic Republic could enable both countries to capitalize on this momentum.

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province, shares a 900-kilometer border with Iran and continues to grapple with persistent insurgency and terrorism. Hosting the Gwadar port, a central component of the flagship China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the province holds a pivotal position in the evolving geopolitics and geoeconomics of the region and beyond. If the Islamic Republic were destabilized, Balochistan’s security situation would likely deteriorate further, undermining the limited existing counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation between the two countries. Such instability could create greater operational space for groups like the Islamic State to carry out attacks in both Balochistan and Iran’s Sistan–Balochistan province.

If the Islamic Republic remains in power, India would be better positioned to safeguard—and potentially expand—its investment in the Chabahar Port. Under the 10-year bilateral agreement signed in 2024, India committed to investing $120 million and extending a $250 million credit line to Iran. This infrastructure development project is a cornerstone of Indo–Iran relations. Consequently, if the regime were destabilized or to collapse, India’s strategic foothold in West Asia would be severely undermined. Au contraire, if the regime survives and negotiates its way out of sanctions, Iran could once again become a critical energy supplier for India, which imported significant volumes of oil from Tehran prior to the reimposition of sanctions.

Even without the lifting of sanctions, assurances of the regime’s survival could help preserve a measure of stability, enabling India’s oil supplies from the Middle East to continue without disruption. However, if Iran responds to regime-threatening provocations by attempting to block the Strait of Hormuz, India’s energy lifeline would be disrupted. At a time when Trump appears poised to impose higher tariffs in response to New Delhi’s purchase of Russian oil, India cannot afford additional volatility surrounding its energy security.

All in all, by rejecting the idea of regime change in Iran, the U.S. could eliminate a significant source of instability in the Middle East. Such a strategic shift would not only open the door to more effective diplomatic engagement with Tehran but also provide economic and strategic dividends for China, Pakistan, and India.

The strategic calculus is clear: regime change in Iran is a zero-sum proposition that would destabilize not just the Middle East but reverberate across Asia's major corridors of power. As the Trump administration weighs its options, it must recognize that the formal abandonment of regime change is not a concession to Tehran but a deliberate move that serves American interests while stabilizing a critical region. The question is not whether Washington can afford to formally renounce regime change, but whether it can afford not to. In an era where U.S.-China competition increasingly defines global dynamics, and where Pakistan and India navigate their own security challenges, Iran's stability emerges as an unexpected point of convergence—a rare instance where American restraint could yield dividends from Beijing to New Delhi. The window for such strategic clarity, however, may be closing rapidly as Tehran's nuclear program advances and regional tensions mount.

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