Welcome to the August–September issue of Durand Dispatch: Strategic Messaging, our monthly briefing that examines how non-state actors across the Afghanistan–Pakistan region shape perception, frame legitimacy, and assert influence through media and narrative. This newsletter complements our sister publication, Durand Dispatch: Perspectives, which covers broader political and security developments across the region. Together, the two provide a fuller understanding of how strategic messaging intersects with on-the-ground dynamics.

This executive summary provides key highlights from our comprehensive August 2025 assessment. For detailed operational breakdowns, strategic implications, geographic threat analysis, and forward-looking assessments covering all major organizations, please subscribe to access the complete issue.

August 2025 witnessed notable tactical and strategic shifts across Pakistan's militant landscape, with organizations demonstrating enhanced coordination, technological adoption, and geographic expansion. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan recorded its highest monthly attack total of the year while leveraging Pashtun nationalist messaging, Baloch separatist groups sustained coordinated operations through the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) consortium, and transnational elements emerged across multiple organizations. The following executive summary highlights key developments from our comprehensive monthly assessment of militant activities, operational patterns, and strategic implications for Pakistan's security environment.

In August 2025, the Tehrik i Taliban (TTP) claimed over 500 attacks, representing the highest monthly total in 2025 and an increase from July's 300+ attack claims. Claims exhibit operational locus in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Khyber and Bajaur districts, with the usage of heavy weapons, including the self-made 'Al Farooq Missile' and thermal imaging technology. Publications also continued to show the TTP's operational expansion to provinces and urban areas outside of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) heartland. The TTP posted visuals from various landmarks in Karachi, while also highlighting militants planning a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack near Islamabad.

The TTP's usage of contemporary socio-political issues within their propaganda, including the mention of recent floods, helicopter crash incident in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the destruction of a mosque in Islamabad, were used as key narratives to stir local support, alongside propaganda reflecting the recent shift toward Pashtun nationalist rhetoric. August also showed the TTP's engagement in local tribal consultations (Jirgas) and rise in attacks on police following the group's ultimatum to local security forces personnel to resign or support the TTP. August also marked a notable escalation in the TTP's transnational messaging, including statements on international subjects and criticism of Quran desecration in Texas.

ISKP resumed operations following a period of reduced activity due to Afghan government crackdowns and mass closure of propaganda accounts across major social media platforms. Building on July's operational constraints and digital containment challenges that forced strategic adaptations in propaganda dissemination, August saw the organization demonstrate operational resilience by claiming attacks in Bajaur and Quetta, while re-establishing its propaganda infrastructure through the reactivated Nida-e-Haq channel focusing primarily on Pakistan. Continuing July's criticism of the Afghan Taliban as Pakistani "puppets" and the TTP as heretical, ISKP's August messaging strategy maintained focus on delegitimizing regional competitors, Pakistani religious scholars, and state officials. The organization's propaganda centered on promoting jihad through religious teachings while condemning nationalism and democracy, warning locals against attending political rallies, and criticizing the alleged Quran burning incident in Texas. Despite sustained deplatforming efforts noted in July, ISKP maintained its ideological offensive through posters featuring Islamic teachings and continued efforts to undermine competitor legitimacy and state institutions.

AQIS maintained its strategic emphasis on theological positioning and contemporary issue exploitation while expanding its multimedia outreach capabilities. The organization continued to leverage testimonials from slain leadership, particularly former deputy Amir Ahmad Farooq, to reinforce ideological messaging that distinguishes AQIS from kinetically-focused competitors and criticizes indiscriminate violence. AQIS demonstrated calculated engagement with current events, releasing statements on recent floods that blamed Muslim rulers for anti-Sharia policies while positioning the organization as humanitarian aid providers. The August edition of flagship magazine Nawa-i-Ghazwa Hind featured Gaza prominently, with editorial content urging Western Muslims to migrate to jihadist centers for combat and other training. AQIS reinforced its ideological discourse through Pakistan Independence Day messaging that invoked historical freedom fighters and blamed political-military leadership for drifting from Islamic foundations.

August activities demonstrate continued coordination through the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) alliance and the National Army of Balochistan, sustaining the operational convergence and strategic consolidation evident in July's assessment. Baloch militant groups demonstrated sustained operational momentum and strategic coordination, building on July's high operational tempo and coordinated activities. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) claimed over attacks as part of the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) consortium, including a 20-day occupation of Zehri city. Building on July's emphasis on recruiting educated youth from urban centers, August featured propaganda seemingly directed at metropolitan demographics, through nationalist songs and detailed tribute materials. The BLA responded forcefully to its U.S. terrorist designation, framing its struggle as legitimate under Geneva Conventions while emphasizing that its struggle is limited to Balochistan. The Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) maintained operational activities despite internet disruptions, with propaganda revealing training camps in Sarawan and Makran, Balochistan. The Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) remained largely dormant due to recent arrests, though it released statements on Pakistan's Independence Day criticizing the 1947 partition.

Ittehad ul Mujahideen (IUM): IUM, a militant alliance comprising the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group (HBG), Lashkar-e-Islam, and Harkat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (HIIP), with support from the Jamaat ul Ahrar (JUA), claimed around a 100 attacks in August 2025 including a suicide attack, with snipers, ambushes and drones as other primary methods. The organization exhibited operational expansion to Orakzai, KP districts while continuing glorification of suicide attacks.

Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (IIP): Allied organizations including Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan (IIP) maintained active propaganda presence focusing on visual content blaming security forces for atrocities, while releasing recruitment materials targeting serving security personnel.

Jamaat ul Ahrar (JUA): JUA retained independent identity through separate attack claims and publication of Al Fajar newspaper, with operations expanding to Karachi while maintaining historical operational areas in tribal districts.

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