Following their takeover of Kabul after the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Afghan Taliban have ruled Afghanistan under the banner of the Islamic Emirate. As Afghanistan’s government collapsed, the international community expressed uncertainty about the country’s future, urging the Taliban to form an inclusive government. When the Taliban announced their interim government in September 2021, many countries established preconditions for diplomatic recognition. Pakistan, however, stood out as the primary advocate against isolating the Taliban, arguing that the group had evolved. Despite having engaged internationally through the Doha Peace Agreement, the Taliban quickly reverted to their historically restrictive interpretation of Islamic law. They promptly renamed Afghanistan the Islamic Emirate, abolished the existing national flag and anthem, and began systematically reshaping the country’s culture, and identity. Despite this domestic crackdown on cultural expression, the Taliban have met with some success in diplomatic engagement internationally, establishing representative offices in several countries, particularly in the region, although no country has officially recognized their government.Soon after coming into power, the Taliban regime's apparent unity soon began to fracture as internal divisions emerged, notably around the Supreme Leader’s controversial decision to ban girls from education.

Together, these dynamics threaten either to catalyze incremental political evolution among Taliban leadership or precipitate violent fragmentation with profound consequences for Afghanistan’s stability and the broader region. The article first examines how internal rivalries have shaped the Taliban’s governance structure, and the role of ethnic marginalization in fueling demands for autonomy among non-Pashtun factions. It then analyzes competition over illicit economic resources as a driver of factional tensions, before considering how external actors exacerbate these divisions. The article concludes by assessing the broader implications of Taliban fragmentation for Afghanistan’s stability and regional security.

Factionalism Among the Taliban

An examination of the Taliban's governance structure reveals not a coherent administrative system but rather a fragile power-sharing arrangement dominated by key figures with competing interests and spheres of influence. Sirajuddin Haqqani controls the Interior Ministry, Mullah Yaqoob heads the Defense Ministry, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar serves as a Deputy Prime Minister, while Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada acts as an overarching authoritarian figure, an “Orwellian Big Brother” wielding the final say on all matters of governance. It is increasingly believed that this “troika” has evolved into two distinct power centers: Akhundzada and his loyalist Ulema Council based in Kandahar, and his political opponents operating from Kabul. However, this dichotomy oversimplifies a complex and mistrustful internal dynamic, as even those characterized as pragmatic dissidents within the Taliban hierarchy do not fully trust each other. High-level analyses frequently reduce Taliban factionalism to a binary opposition between hardliners and moderates. Yet such framing obscures a more intricate reality in which divisions span multiple dimensions. Policy disagreements—particularly over girls' education—have become merely the visible battleground upon which these factions pursue their deeper strategic objectives.

Animosity over Power Sharing

The factional power struggle within the Taliban regime manifested violently in the immediate aftermath of Kabul's fall, when security personnel loyal to Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar reportedly engaged in an armed confrontation over ministerial appointments——an incident that exposed the deep tensions underlying the group’s purported unity. As Hibatullah Akhundzada consolidated his grip on power, the Haqqani Network sought to appoint Anis Haqqani, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s brother to a more prominent diplomatic role, but the proposal was ultimately rejected. Akhundzada has further curtailed Sirajuddin Haqqani’s authority by appointing two of his own loyalists as deputies within the Interior Ministry, thereby enabling the implementation of policies even without Haqqani’s direct consent. With his authority increasingly restricted, Haqqani issued a rare veiled public critique in February 2023, stating that “power monopolization and defamation of the entire [ruling] system have become common. This situation cannot be tolerated any longer.” In response to these remarks the Minister of Information Zabihullah Mujahid urged officials to observe the Islamic ethics and refrain from criticising the Emir publicly. On another occasion, Sirajuddin Haqqani reminded the supreme leader that even the Emir is accountable to Allah. 

Despite these tensions, Sirajuddin Haqqani has strategically entrenched his influence by securing key posts for his loyalists across sectors related to taxation, smuggling of goods, and the lucrative drug trade. Beside Haqqani, Mullah Yaqoob also emerges as a contender for leadership succession. Mullah Yaqoob, widely respected amongst rank-and-file fighters, was considered a natural heir to his father Mullah Omar’s legacy. However, he was passed over when the Taliban leadership was handed to Mullah Mansour instead. While Taliban factions in eastern Afghanistan consolidate power, in the western provinces—home to significant Tajik and Uzbek Taliban contingents—there are growing pressures for greater decentralization and ethnic autonomy, reflecting further fault lines within the movement.

Marginalization along Ethnic Lines

While the Taliban’s governance structure incorporates members from multiple ethnic groups, it operates through systematic marginalization of non-Pashtun constituencies. As previously noted, the Taliban’s leadership includes ethnic Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara figures, yet these groups face discrimination and exclusion at the hands of their Pashtun counterparts. This ethnic stratification became starkly evident in January 2022 with the detention of prominent Uzbek commander Makhdoom Alam on allegations of kidnapping and ties to Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—a move that precipitated widespread protests among the Uzbek community in Faryab province, which the Taliban leadership largely ignored.

Even non-Pashtun figures holding senior titles find their authority heavily circumscribed by directives from Kandahar. Notably, Qari Fasihuddin Fitrat, an ethnic Tajik credited with overseeing much of the Taliban’s 2021 military campaign, lacks the authority to appoint or transfer commanders independently. This entrenched ethnic hierarchy has fueled autonomy demands, particularly among Uzbek Taliban factions in the provinces of Faryab, Jawzjan, and Sar-i-Pul. The pattern of marginalization extends to the Hazara Taliban as well. Maulawi Mahdi, the only known Hazara commander within Taliban ranks, defected following disputes over the ownership of a coal mine in his native Balkhab district. After severing ties with the Taliban, Mahdi returned to Balkhab, mobilized local forces, and forced the Taliban-appointed governor to flee to Kabul. Following Mahdi’s declaration of resistance against the Taliban leadership, Taliban forces launched a major military operation against him. Some reports suggest that elements associated with ISKP may have been opportunistically involved in the crackdown, though this remains disputed. On-and-off clashes between Mahdi’s forces and Pashtun-Sunni Taliban fighters reportedly continued until August 2022, when Mahdi was ultimately killed. While the Taliban succeeded in eliminating Mahdi and his inner circle, the brutal campaign further alienated Afghanistan’s Hazara-Shia community, amplifying ethnic tensions and creating long-term risks of instability for an already fractured Taliban regime.

Discord Over Policies

The most visible manifestation of Taliban factionalism centers on divergent interpretations of Sharia law disagreements over the severity of its implementation. Hibatullah Akhundzada and his Kandahar-based Ulema Council advocate an uncompromising theological position, while a loose coalition of figures—including Mullah Yaqoob, Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and Mullah Ghani Baradar—supports a more calibrated approach, although this grouping lacks cohesive coordination. The Supreme Leader’s faction has issued austere edicts rooted in strict Islamic jurisprudence, whereas the Kabul-based figures advocate moderated enforcement—emphasizing the need to balance religious orthodoxy with international diplomatic pressures and domestic legitimacy concerns. Points of contention include the application of Hudud punishments (such as floggings, executions, and stoning), restrictions on women's public presence and attire, and—most contentiously—access to education for women and girls. Notably, the strategic politicization of the female education ban by the so-called pragmatists appears calculated to cultivate popular support by positioning themselves in opposition to Akhundzada's hardline stance. 

The most outspoken critic of the Taliban’s ban on women’s education from within the group has been Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai. Stanikzai first publicly dissented from Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada’s edicts during a speech in Logar province, where he stated that "agreeing with the leader’s order is not compulsory if it is not according to Islam." In May 2022, he further admonished the leadership, declaring, "We must aim to win the hearts of our people rather than rule over them with batons." Stanikzai, increasingly viewed as the face of the internal opposition to Akhundzada’s hardline faction, intensified his criticisms on January 18, 2025. In a widely reported speech, he stated, "We have closed the doors of education to women, deprived them of inheritance rights, and denied them the liberty to choose their partners; we implore the leadership to reopen schools, as there is no excuse for their continued closure." Some reports suggest that following these remarks, Taliban leadership factions considered disciplinary actions against Stanikzai, with rumors of an arrest warrant surfacing in activist networks, although no official confirmation was publicly issued. According to unverified accounts, Stanikzai subsequently departed for the United Arab Emirates on January 24. Stanikzai’s continued criticism has provoked open hostility from loyalists of the Supreme Leader. Recently, the governor of Balkh province, Aminullah (also known as Muhammad Yousaf Wafa), reportedly filed a complaint to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanding Stanikzai’s punishment for "disloyalty to the Emir in violation of Islamic conduct." In response, Stanikzai posted a message on his X (formerly Twitter) account, stating: "If justice does not prevail and equal rights are not given in a country, the system collapses and people flee from it."

Both Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Muhammad Yaqoob (the son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar) have publicly positioned themselves in opposition to certain edicts issued by Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, though scholarly consensus suggests that their dissent reflects calculated political maneuvering rather than principled ideological opposition. Sirajuddin Haqqani, in particular, has been vocal in criticizing policies that draw international condemnation, thereby seeking to soften his image as the leader of the Haqqani Network—the Taliban faction responsible for hundreds of suicide attacks during Afghanistan’s previous government, including attacks targeting civilians. Haqqani has repeatedly expressed disagreement with the ban on women’s education and restrictions on their employment in government offices. His carefully calibrated opposition appears aimed at distancing himself from the regime’s most internationally condemned policies. Reportedly Haqqani made personal appeals to Akhundzada to ease the restrictions; when these appeals were ignored, he allegedly began boycotting leadership meetings in Kandahar as a form of protest. While his criticisms have not yet borne tangible results, Haqqani expressed cautious optimism in a 2023 interview, stating, "the current situation does not mean that girls are forever denied from going to schools and receiving an education." Alongside Haqqani, Mullah Yaqoob has adopted a softer rhetorical approach, frequently invoking themes of responsibility, mercy, and accountability. In a 2023 speech, Yaqoob urged the Supreme Leader and the Ulema Council to "always listen to the legitimate demands of the people."

Rifts over the Provision of Safe Havens to Foreign Terrorist Groups

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's 2025 assessment documents the continued operational presence of transnational militant organizations within Afghan territory—a direct contravention of Taliban commitments codified in the Doha Agreement. This compliance failure reveals perhaps the most strategically consequential internal division within the Taliban leadership: the Haqqanis are generally supportive of providing sanctuary to foreign militant entities, which stands in direct opposition to the position maintained by the Kandahari faction and Mullah Yaqoob, who recognize the diplomatic liabilities of such relationships.

The Haqqani Network has been specifically in favor of protecting Al-Qaida and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while Mullah Yaqoob warns that hosting such groups will further isolate the Taliban internationally. There are also indications that Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and key Kandahari figures view the TTP with skepticism, questioning its legitimacy as a true jihadi movement. According to former Pakistani Senator Afrasiyab Khattak, Pakistan’s efforts to engage the Taliban on TTP issues have stalled—partly due to Sirajuddin Haqqani’s ambiguous absence abroad, with Islamabad reluctant to negotiate solely with the Kandahari faction. Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s neighbors and other powers are cultivating ties with different Taliban factions to advance their own interests, further deepening internal divisions. China is reportedly working closely with the Haqqanis, focusing on curbing ETIM activities and securing access to Afghanistan’s mineral resources. Iran has strengthened ties with the Kandahari Taliban, while India is believed to be courting Mullah Yaqoob, who previously called for training assistance and the reopening of India’s embassy in Kabul. These external engagements, often framed around pressuring the Taliban to constrain specific terrorist threats, underscore—and may exacerbate—the internal divides over the provision of safe havens.

Taliban Inc. The Internal Bazaar for Guns, God, and Greed

Afghanistan, long a key component of the Golden Crescent—the major opium-producing region of South Asia—provided fertile ground for the Taliban to fund their insurgency, ultimately enabling their return to power in Kabul, aided by regional neighbors and shifting geopolitical dynamics. However, the same illicit economy that once financed the Taliban’s insurgency is now emerging as a source of internal conflict, as various factions seek to claim the spoils of victory. The principal competitors for control of Afghanistan’s black market are the Haqqani Network, the Haibatullah Akhundzada faction, and a number of smaller warlords, although the latter wield considerably less influence. This illicit economy encompasses opium, methamphetamine, heroin, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and the smuggling of legal goods. Although Taliban leadership publicly announced a ban on poppy cultivation in April 2022—which resulted in a dramatic revenue decline from $1.36 billion in 2022 to just $110 million in 2023—internal factional disputes have persisted. Indeed, it is not merely the poppy economy that fuels Taliban factional rivalries; profits from broader illicit activities are increasingly becoming points of contention among the group’s powerful factions.

Although the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) officially claimed responsibility for both attacks, several analysts suggest that internal Taliban rivalries over the lucrative illicit economy may have played a decisive role. The killing of Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani—long regarded as the Haqqani Network’s chief fundraiser and a central figure in managing illicit operations across Afghanistan, Pakistan’s tribal regions, and other territories—further substantiates this assessment. The pattern of these high-profile killings, all targeting figures deeply embedded in illicit financial activities, points to a broader trend. Taken together, these assassinations suggest a deliberate strategy in which Taliban factions seek to weaken each other by targeting and eliminating the principal figures responsible for overseeing illicit revenue streams.

Implications for Pakistan 

While the growing tensions within the Taliban may be quietly welcomed by progressive forces in Pakistan—given the Taliban’s oppressive rule in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s unmet strategic objectives in Kabul, and the spillover of extremism into adjacent areas—these internal fractures carry significant risks for Pakistan’s security landscape. Specifically, the ongoing divisions within the Taliban pose two major threats to Pakistan more broadly. First, a fragmented Taliban may lack the cohesion necessary to effectively counter the growing threat from Islamic State Khorasan Province,(ISKP) which is also active in Pakistan’s Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. Second, should these internal Taliban tensions escalate into open hostilities, the resulting instability could further deteriorate security conditions—disrupting trade across the Durand Line, triggering population displacement, creating fertile ground for militant recruitment, and undermining non-violent, progressive political forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Thus, while Taliban infighting might offer short-term advantages for Pakistan’s progressive constituencies, it also threatens to unleash broader destabilizing dynamics that Pakistan is ill-prepared to manage.

Future Trajectories

While the Taliban continue to project an image of external cohesion, deepening internal fissures within its leadership structure have created a dynamic aptly conceptualized through the Platonic notion of pharmakon—simultaneously embodying both destructive potential and opportunities for political transformation in Afghanistan. These internal tensions mirror the dual nature of the pharmakon: they carry the possibility of either the Taliban’s complete disintegration or a gradual transformation that could bring an end to their Machiavellian grip over Afghanistan. At the same time, however, these very fissures risk plunging the country into renewed misery, potentially culminating in civil conflict. The Taliban is facing a critical turning point shaped by three forces: the Supreme Leader’s push for centralized control, growing demands for ethno-regional autonomy that challenge religious unity, and competing factions using policy differences to build separate public images. These overlapping tensions could either lead to gradual political change within the group or cause a major split, with serious consequences for Afghanistan’s stability and regional security.

One potential scenario involves gradual moderation under multilateral pressure. The convergence of international diplomatic isolation, Afghan diaspora advocacy, and—most critically—internal factional tensions could push Akhundzada to soften certain policies. His recent rhetorical emphasis on education’s importance—while notably excluding female education—signals limited adjustment rather than genuine ideological change. Some analysts interpret Akhundzada’s language shifts as tentative signs of flexibility within Afghanistan's governance. However, substantive liberalization in education, gender rights, and political inclusivity would contradict the ideological foundations that legitimized the Taliban's two-decade insurgency. Implementing such reforms would not only undermine their core discourse but also expose the group to accusations of hypocrisy, as these very issues formed the basis of their criticisms against the former Afghan government. As a result, meaningful transformation appears highly improbable. 

A more likely trajectory is escalating factional confrontation, as competing power centers—each cultivating distinct public personas—vie for dominance. Several factors could fuel this fragmentation: growing competition for centralized authority, ethno-regional autonomy demands, control over illicit economies, and external meddling. In short, ceding ideological ground to enable reform appears unlikely, while the outbreak of intra-Taliban violence seems increasingly probable. Current dynamics suggest that the group’s internal contradictions are becoming untenable, making factional conflict a more realistic outcome than ideological compromise sufficient to address humanitarian concerns.

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