Pakistan has entered a phase of concurrent insurgency that is no longer episodic but structurally embedded across two distinct conflict theaters. In November, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) escalated urban terrorism with high-profile attacks on state institutions, while Baloch separatist groups demonstrated a high level of coordination through synchronized, multi-district operations targeting both security forces and critical infrastructure. These campaigns unfolded simultaneously yet stem from fundamentally different ideological logics, organizational structures, and grievance narratives. This convergence coincided with the collapse of diplomatic engagement between Islamabad and Afghanistan’s Taliban government, effectively dismantling the last remaining bilateral mechanisms for managing cross-border militancy. 

The result has been a strategic narrowing of Pakistan’s options: reliance on unilateral kinetic pressure to contain threats rooted in sanctuaries, political economies, and social grievances that military force alone cannot resolve. The operational evolution was stark. A suicide bombing at Islamabad’s district court complex—the capital’s deadliest attack since 2008—demonstrated militants ability to penetrate layered security near the core of the state, while in Balochistan, separatist groups executed nearly three dozen attacks across eight districts within seventy-two hours, employing tactical sequencing designed to maximize casualties and disruption. The analysis below identifies five interlocking realities that define Pakistan’s current militancy landscape, illustrating how operational escalation, strategic fragmentation, and political constraints are converging to limit the state’s capacity to restore durable internal security.

Urban terrorism surged in November as militants demonstrated enhanced capacity to strike Pakistan's cities with coordinated precision, marking an escalation in the frequency, sophistication, and lethality of attacks targeting state institutions in densely populated centers. Three coordinated attacks within fifteen days struck Islamabad, Peshawar, and South Waziristan, revealing organizational coherence that has survived years of sustained counterterrorism pressure and suggesting operational networks extend deeper into Pakistan's urban centers than previously assessed.

The attacks required reconnaissance, multi-stage planning, and suicide penetration teams willing to sacrifice themselves against hardened targets. On November 11, a suicide bomber spent 10-15 minutes conducting surveillance outside Islamabad's district court complex before detonating near a police vehicle as hundreds of litigants, lawyers, and court staff occupied the facility. Twelve people were killed and twenty-seven wounded in what marked the deadliest attack on the capital since 2008. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar—a TTP faction—initially claimed responsibility, though a commander within the group later disputed the claim, reflecting continuing internal divisions within Pakistan's militant networks. The group framed the attack as targeting "judges, lawyers and officials who carried out rulings under Pakistan's un-Islamic laws."

Two days prior, security forces killed five militants who attacked Cadet College Wana in South Waziristan with an explosive-laden vehicle, attempting to breach the compound housing 650 students and staff. The ISPR noted militants intended to replicate the 2014 Army Public School attack that killed 132 school children. Subsequently, on November 24, three suicide bombers struck the Federal Constabulary headquarters in Peshawar as personnel assembled for weekly formation, with investigations suggesting hostage-taking objectives before security forces neutralized the attackers.

Baloch separatist violence in November demonstrated operational coordination that exceeded the intensity of previous campaigns. The Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for 29 operations across Gwadar,  Mastung,  Chamalang, and Kohlu districts, allegedly killing 27 Pakistani military personnel, while the Balochistan Liberation Front claimed six additional operations reporting seven military deaths. This geographic spread and operational tempo marked a qualitative shift from isolated attacks to a sustained campaign across multiple districts.

The tactical advancement was evident in the Qambrani Road attack, which employed deliberate sequencing to target first responders. A grenade attack on a police checkpoint was followed by the detonation of a secondary IED concealed in a motorcycle, specifically targeting Counter-Terrorism Department personnel responding to the initial blast. This layering of attacks reflected a level of planning that extended well beyond improvised violence. That same day witnessed seven explosions across Quetta and Dera Murad Jamali, including an explosion that destroyed a railway track near Lohr Karez and suspended train traffic.

Railway infrastructure emerged as a primary target throughout the month. The Jaffar Express, suffered its sixth attack on the Quetta-Sibi route in just six weeks when gunmen opened fire near Aab-i-Gum in Bolan Pass on November 26. This follows an incident on November 16 where an IED detonated on the track in Nasirabad as the Jaffar Express travelled from Quetta to Peshawar on November 16, with the Baloch Republican Guards claiming responsibility. In addition, just 24 hours after the November 26 attack, Police foiled an attempt to attack the train using an IED planted on the track at Dera Murad Jamali as the train travelled the same route. These incidents contributed to at least 18 attacks on railway infrastructure in 2025, demonstrating a deliberate strategy to disrupt provincial connectivity and impose sustained economic costs.

The Nokkundi attack represented a notable attack during the month of November when a female suicide bomber, later identified by the Balochistan Liberation Front as Zareena Rafiq, detonated an explosive-laden vehicle at the Frontier Corps headquarters gate, before six armed militants attempted to storm the compound. Security forces killed all six attackers during extended firefighting. The deployment of a female suicide bomber marked a notable operational change for the BLF, which had previously refrained from such tactics. This represented the fifth female suicide attack in Balochistan since April 2022, but the first attributed to BLF rather than BLA's Majeed Brigade.

The location carried significance: Nokkundi lies in close proximity to the Reko Diq copper-gold project, a $7 billion joint venture representing Pakistan's largest foreign mining investment. This targeting pattern indicates that security infrastructure protecting major economic projects has become a focus for militants opposing resource extraction. The capacity to execute combined operations across multiple districts within 72 hours represents operational reach and coordination that Pakistani security forces have struggled to counter. Unlike TTP's ideologically motivated violence, the Baloch insurgency is linked to ethno-nationalist grievances over resource control and political marginalization, requiring counterinsurgency approaches distinct from those applied against religious extremism.

Pakistan's counterterrorism strategy fractured in November as federal and provincial authorities pursued incompatible approaches, with federal forces intensifying kinetic operations while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's (KP) elected leadership advocated dialogue-based solutions.

Federal security forces reportedly conducted  over 60 thousand intelligence-based operations nationally from January through November, with operational tempo increasing to hundreds of daily operations in the month's final weeks. Concurrently, provincial leadership pursued strategy grounded in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, creating divergence that complicates counterterrorism consensus.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Sohail Afridi convened a peace jirga on November 12 bringing together former governors, tribal elders, religious scholars, political party representatives, journalists, and civil society activists. The gathering produced a 15-point declaration demanding the federal government prioritize negotiations with Afghanistan, involve KP in policy formulation, reopen Afghan trade routes, and release KP's Rs400 billion National Finance Commission share. Weeks earlier, the KP Commission on the Status of Women had demanded women's inclusion in peace deliberations, citing constitutional provisions and UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The institutional push reflected over a decade of grassroots organizing by women's groups including Khwendo Jirga in Swat and SAWERA in the former tribal areas, whose co-founder Farida Afridi was assassinated in 2012 for her conflict prevention work. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement had already normalized women's participation in large-scale political gatherings through its 2022 and 2024 jirgas, demonstrating what civil society could achieve despite state reluctance.

The Swat Qaumi Jirga separately criticized federal and provincial governments for perceived inaction and alleged that instability stemmed from previous policies regarding militant resettlement. The KP cabinet withdrew its petition supporting the Action in Aid of Civil Power law, declaring it contrary to basic human rights. This occurred as federal forces conducted clearance operations in Bajaur under Operation Azm-e-Istehkam. A parliamentary committee revealed 4,000 terrorists present in KP while expressing trust deficit regarding security operations and demanding stakeholder consultation before launching operations.

This disagreement creates operational uncertainty for security forces and undermines intelligence cooperation from populations whose political representatives advocate dialogue. The grand jirga in Orakzai ahead of Muharram that brought together Sunni and Shia community elders to promote peace and communal harmony, illustrated how traditional forums can help manage sectarian and inter-community dynamics that purely military approaches do not resolve. Without federal–provincial alignment on whether force or dialogue constitutes the primary strategy, Pakistan lacks a coherent counterterrorism doctrine.

Pakistan pursued institutional expansion of its counterterrorism apparatus during November alongside active operations against militants—a simultaneous investment in both immediate tactical responses and long-term structural capacity. The Economic Coordination Committee approved supplementary grants for defense and security, with resources set aside for Defense Services projects focused on border surveillance, equipment maintenance and border control.

KP Chief Minister Afridi approved creation of the police Special Branch as a dedicated intelligence and counter-terrorism unit separate from existing police structures, with new positions backed by resources for infrastructure, vehicles, and for technical equipment and surveillance systems. The Special Branch had previously operated under the regular police force, but Afridi's decision established it as an independent entity with expanded mandate for intelligence gathering, security assessments, and surveillance operations. Balochistan Chief Minister Bugti announced commitment to police modernization with updated training and weapons, including Levies force integration into the police department to create a unified command structure across districts previously managed by separate paramilitary forces.

Former counterterrorism officials and analysts have questioned whether establishing multiple institutional structures — rather than strengthening coordination among existing ones like NACTA — improves operational efficiency or instead creates competing bureaucracies that fragment resources and dilute command authority. This debate reflects broader uncertainty within Pakistan about whether its counterterrorism challenge requires new organizations or better coordination across agencies and political consensus.

Balochistan's insurgency operates within an expanding narcotics trade that provides militants funding streams and creates a self-sustaining conflict economy. Enforcement operations in November revealed the scale: Pakistan Coast Guards seized narcotics worth $134.43 million in Gwadar region—1,400 kg hashish, 105 kg crystal methamphetamine, 8 kg heroin, and 6.5 kg opium. Earlier in the month, the Excise and Taxation Department destroyed thousands of acres of illegally cultivated cannabis, using drones and satellite mapping in Qila Abdullah district.

The primary driver is Afghanistan's Taliban-enforced opium ban, which has displaced poppy cultivation into Pakistani territory, with Balochistan's ungoverned spaces absorbing illicit production. In November 2025, the Balochistan Excise, Taxation and Anti-Narcotics Department, with support from the International Narcotics & Law (INL), launched an advanced training program for provincial officers that focuses on intelligence-based operations, scientific investigation techniques, and legal prosecution under the Anti-Narcotics Act. This appears to be  a clear acknowledgment by provincial authorities that combating regional drug trafficking requires modern, coordinated, and professionally structured enforcement capabilities rather than purely conventional policing.

These dynamics create a mutually reinforcing cycle in which insurgent violence and narcotics trafficking sustain one another. Militants extract protection rents from traffickers, channel drug revenues into weapons procurement and recruitment, and exploit ungoverned spaces where state presence remains thin. At the same time, counternarcotics operations necessitate security deployments that become targets for separatist attacks, while trafficking-related corruption corrodes the very governance institutions required for effective law enforcement. Absent a strategy that addresses both the political economy of insurgency—legitimate grievances over exclusion and resource extraction—and the illicit revenues generated by narcotics, kinetic operations are likely to yield only episodic disruption rather than durable degradation of militant capacity.

Pakistan confronts operational challenges across multiple dimensions where tactical effectiveness does not translate to strategic resolution. Security forces demonstrated capacity to conduct high-tempo operations while TTP and Baloch separatist groups proved capable of mounting attacks despite sustained pressure, suggesting organizational resilience and sanctuary access that kinetic operations alone cannot eliminate.

Three structural contradictions undermine operational effectiveness. First, the federal-provincial split over strategy creates a situation where KP's elected government advocates dialogue while federal forces conduct clearance operations in the same districts, ensuring neither approach receives full implementation. Second, Pakistan invested in institutional expansion—new police units, upgraded infrastructure, expanded bureaucracies—though it remains unclear whether dealing with  immediate threats requires more capacity or better coordination, or perhaps both. Third, Balochistan's narcotics trade generates conflict economics that survives tactical disruptions, with militants extracting resources for their operations.

The collapse of Pakistan-Afghanistan diplomatic channels removed a key mechanism for addressing TTP's cross-border sanctuary, leaving Islamabad dependent on kinetic pressure to degrade threats it cannot eliminate. Pakistan has effectively committed to indefinite counterinsurgency, accepting sustained military casualties, civilian costs from operations, and strategic uncertainty as the price of preventing militant consolidation. Whether this approach proves sustainable depends on variables Pakistan cannot control: TTP's organizational cohesion under attrition, Baloch separatists' regeneration capacity, and civilian tolerance for campaigns with no clear endpoint. 

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