Afghanistan War Commission Holds its Second Public Hearing

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On April 11, 2025, the U.S. Senate’s Afghanistan War Commission held its second public hearing — a critical reckoning with the early years of America’s longest war. Co-chaired by Shamila Chaudhary and Dr. Colin Jackson, the hearing focused on the formative 2001–2009 period, examining what decisions were made, by whom, and with what consequences. The Commission’s goal: to bring moral clarity and historical depth to a war that, for many Americans, became a distant abstraction.

If there’s one through-line across all three panels, it’s this: the U.S. went to war with assumptions, not answers. Assumptions about what Afghans wanted, about what institutions could be built, and about who our real partners were — in Kabul and in the region. When Afghan voices were invited to the table, it was often symbolic. When regional diplomacy was needed, it was often reactive. But the most important lesson isn’t just about Afghanistan — it’s about how the U.S. approaches future conflicts. The tools of war are only as good as the clarity of purpose behind them. And if we don’t examine the architecture of our decisions — not just the outcomes — we risk building the same house on the same shaky foundation again.

Over three panels, a diverse group of generals, diplomats, aid administrators, and former Afghan officials offered testimony. Their reflections painted a sobering picture — of initial tactical brilliance, followed by strategic drift, unrealistic expectations, and systemic fragmentation that undermined the U.S. mission from the outset.

The first panel centered on the immediate aftermath of 9/11, featuring Ambassador Henry Crumpton, Ambassador Nancy Powell, and Colonel Anthony Harman. Crumpton, who led the CIA's Afghanistan campaign in 2001–2002, emphasized that the early CIA-Special Forces campaign was not an invasion — it was enabled by Afghan partners and achieved stunning results through local cooperation, intelligence-led precision, and agile command.

However, what followed, was a failure to consolidate victory. The U.S. shifted toward Iraq too quickly, leaving Afghanistan’s fledgling institutions vulnerable. Powell highlighted that Washington’s strategic focus blurred as counterterrorism morphed into state-building and counterinsurgency, often without recalibrating policy or leadership on the ground.

A recurring theme was the disconnect between decision-making in Washington and realities on the ground, worsened by the lack of understanding of Afghan society and regional dynamics — particularly Pakistan’s pivotal and contradictory role.

The second panel dug into governance, aid, and political engineering, with insights from Yunus Qanooni, Ambassador Omar Dawoodzai, Ambassador Richard Boucher, and Andrew Natsios.

Qanooni and Dawoodzai argued that the 2001 Bonn Conference, while full of promise, was deeply flawed. The exclusion of the Taliban from the talks, U.S. favoritism toward Afghan expatriates, and the lack of robust implementation mechanisms led to a brittle state. “There was no shared national vision,” said Dawoodzai. He emphasized that the push for a centralized presidential system ignored Afghanistan’s ethnic and political realities, fueling marginalization and insurgency.

Natsios reflected on early USAID efforts to stabilize the economy — including famine prevention, agriculture boosts, and healthcare — which were initially low-cost and high-impact. But by 2004, aid had become bloated and inefficient, producing diminishing returns. He described the aid program’s arc as moving from “solving urgent problems” to “spending for optics,” a cautionary tale of money outpacing strategy.The Afghanistan Connection Despite dropping to ninth place in the Global Terrorism Index, Afghanistan's internal dynamics continue to directly influence Pakistan's security environment.

The final panel featured General David Barno and Lt. Gen. Keith Stalder, both of whom oversaw early military strategy.

Barno recalled how resources diverted to Iraq left Afghanistan under-resourced at a critical time. “We had 140,000 troops in Iraq and only 14,000 in Afghanistan,” he said. His guidance from CENTCOM included building a new Afghan Army, overseeing elections, hunting al-Qaeda, and enabling Taliban reintegration — but with almost no new resources.

Both generals lamented the lack of unity of effort across military, diplomatic, and development operations. Leadership churn — 15 commanders and 12 ambassadors over 20 years — made long-term strategy almost impossible. Meanwhile, Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan made battlefield gains fleeting. The enemy could retreat, regroup, and wait out offensives.