Hussnain Ashar is a Fellow at the Global Peace Institute (UK) and a counterterrorism practitioner with over a decade of experience analysing militant networks in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. His work focuses on technology and terrorism, transnational jihadist networks, digital radicalization, terrorist financing (CFT), and P/CVE.
Recent arrests, confirmed fatalities, and official investigations indicate that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has developed an emerging recruitment pipeline in Bangladesh, marking a significant expansion of the group’s transnational reach. This article examines confirmed cases, First Information Reports (FIRs), and statements from Bangladeshi authorities to map radicalization pathways, recruitment intermediaries, and travel routes linking Bangladeshi nationals to TTP operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The analysis identifies three primary mechanisms facilitating recruitment: online radicalization networks, clerical mentorship embedded in domestic militant ecosystems, and labour-migration narratives used as logistical and psychological cover. The role of intermediary organisations, particularly Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS), illustrates how domestic militant infrastructures can evolve into conduits for transnational mobilisation. These findings suggest that Bangladesh is increasingly functioning not only as a site of domestic militancy but also as a feeder environment for regional jihadist movements. The article concludes by assessing the implications for counterterrorism policy, intelligence cooperation, and prevention strategies across South Asia.
While the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has long maintained ties to transnational jihadist networks—including Al-Qaeda and various foreign fighter contingents operating in Pakistan’s tribal areas—its recruitment base has historically been drawn from Pakistan’s own tribal districts. Recent evidence, however, shows that TTP-linked networks are increasingly reaching across borders—recruiting, radicalising, and operationalising in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh itself has long grappled with domestic militancy. Groups such as Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HUJI-B), and Ansar al-Islam have operated nationwide, targeting secular institutions, minority communities, and government authorities. While each group has distinct origins and objectives, they collectively reflect a domestic landscape in which jihadist ideology—including direct organisational ties to Al-Qaeda, particularly through Ansar al-Islam—has established deep roots. It is against this backdrop that evidence of TTP’s operational footprint in Bangladesh has surfaced.
On July 5, 2025, the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) of Bangladesh registered FIR No. 17/2025 under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The ATU named Foysal and five associates—Al Imran (alias Engineer Imran Haider), Rezaul Karim Abrar, Asif Adnan, Zakaria Masud, and Md Sanaf Hasan—underscoring the networked and transnational nature of TTP-linked activity in Bangladesh. During interrogation, Foysal allegedly confessed that he had travelled to Afghanistan in October 2024 with Zubair Ahmed, who was subsequently killed in a Pakistan Army operation in Waziristan in April 2025.
Beyond this formal investigation, reporting has also traced Bangladeshi nationals joining TTP in Pakistan, often under the pretext of work or religious travel. According to the head of CTTI Bangladesh, 25–30 Bangladeshis are present in the ranks of the TTP, and Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP). Confirmed cases include Faisal Hossain, a 22-year-old from Madaripur killed in Pakistan’s Karak district; Zubair Ahmed, 22, believed to have been killed in April 2025; and Ratan Dhali, 29, whose fate remains the subject of conflicting reports. Together, these cases illustrate a pattern of cross-border recruitment and radicalization. These developments suggest that Bangladesh may no longer be only a source of domestic militancy; it appears to be emerging as a recruitment ground for regional jihadist networks, particularly TTP, which leverages digital outreach, ideological narratives, and migration channels to expand its influence.
The case of Ratan Dhali illustrates the challenge of verifying fatalities in this pipeline. In early November 2025, the CTTI informed Dhali’s family that he had been killed in the September 26 operation alongside Faisal Hossain. However, in early December 2025, a video surfaced on Bangladeshi social media showing someone identified as Dhali claiming to be alive. CTTI Superintendent Rawshan Sadia Afroz stated that investigators examined the video and determined it to be fabricated, though no forensic analysis was conducted. TTP spokesperson Imran Haider initially confirmed Dhali’s death but later retracted the statement, claiming Dhali was only presumed dead due to his disappearance.
The confirmed recruits share common socioeconomic characteristics that help explain their vulnerability to recruitment. Ratan Dhali studied only until class five, with his father working as a battery-run auto-rickshaw driver. Faisal Hossain completed matriculation; his father worked as an electrical line labourer and his brother as a deliveryman. Zubair Ahmed, who had been pursuing an undergraduate degree in Islamic Studies, came from a middle-class background. Militant recruiters systematically target young people from rural districts who are seeking employment abroad or experiencing financial hardship, exploiting their economic vulnerability with promises of financial security and religious purpose.
The scope of this article is limited to confirmed cases, official FIRs, and statements from Bangladeshi authorities, providing a clear, evidence-based picture. This emerging trend matters because it signals the transnationalization of terrorism, with TTP expanding its reach deeper into South Asia, challenging national security frameworks, and linking local militancy to global jihadist networks.
The JAFHS Bridge: From Domestic Militancy to Transnational Recruitment
Understanding the TTP recruitment pipeline in Bangladesh requires examining one critical organisational link: Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya (JAFHS), the militant group founded by Shamin Mahfuz, who was later arrested in connection with TTP recruitment activities.
JAFHS was officially founded in 2019 (though some sources cite 2017) by Mahfuz, though the concept was conceived as early as 2015 while he was incarcerated. Mainul Islam (alias Hasan, alias Roxy) from Ansar al-Islam and Maulana Abu Sayeed from HUJI-B were instrumental in the group’s formation. JAFHS emerged on Bangladesh’s threat landscape at a time when other jihadist groups were being suppressed following the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack. JAFHS established ties with the Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF), an ethnic separatist group in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, to receive military training. In March/April 2020, JAFHS and KNF negotiated a mutual non-interference agreement, with JAFHS agreeing to cover KNF’s expenses and pay KNF trainers for providing instruction on raids, ambushes, improvised explosive devices, submachine guns, and AK-47 assault rifles. According to the Rapid Action Battalion, JAFHS had trained members in the Chittagong Hill Tracts under KNF supervision and had plans to establish a naval unit in Patuakhali District. Bangladesh banned JAFHS on August 10, 2023, following the arrest of its key leadership and the discovery of these extensive training operations.
Mahfuz’s trajectory—from JMB associate to JAFHS founder to alleged TTP recruitment facilitator—illustrates how Bangladesh’s domestic militant networks have evolved to serve as conduits for transnational recruitment. The organisational infrastructure, personal contacts, and operational experience developed through groups like JAFHS provided the foundation upon which TTP’s cross-border pipeline could be built.
Radicalization Pathways
Bangladeshi youth have been drawn into TTP’s orbit through three principal radicalization pathways: online recruitment, clerical mentorship, and the exploitation of labour migration narratives. Each pathway builds on the others, creating an integrated system that moves individuals from initial ideological exposure to active militant engagement.
Online Radicalization The Islamist ecosystem in Bangladesh provides a favourable environment for TTP recruitment, with decades of Al-Qaeda–aligned ideology creating a pool of already radicalized individuals. Political instability, weak enforcement, and the resurgence of hardline groups have made extremist narratives more visible and socially accepted, particularly among youth. This pre-radicalized population allows TTP to redirect sympathisers toward cross-border militancy, often presenting itself as part of a broader global jihad.
One of the primary entry points is online radicalization, largely coordinated by operatives such as Imran Haider, an aeronautical engineer, as reported by the Counter Terrorism & Transnational Intelligence (CTTI) of Bangladesh. Through private messaging groups and digital forums in local languages, Haider exposes young men to narratives portraying Pakistan as the obstacle to regional jihad while presenting TTP as the only legitimate avenue for religious struggle. In these spaces, recruits are often misled into believing they are supporting Al-Qaeda, when they are in fact being channeled into TTP ranks. The cases of Zubair Ahmed, 22, a student at Savar Government College, killed in April 2025, and Ratan Dhali, 29, whose fate remains disputed, highlight how online recruitment can rapidly convert ordinary youth into transnational fighters.
Clerical Mentorship Religious authority serves as a critical transition point in this radicalization process. Local clerics such as Mohammad Abu Sayed and Mufti Mahmudul Hasan Gunobi provide ideological legitimacy and act as intermediaries, framing religious obligation as a duty to join cross-border militancy. Many recruits, including Shamin Mahfuz, the founder of JAFHS, were initially embedded in domestic extremist networks. Shamin, who was arrested multiple times for his militant activities and previously engaged in training operatives in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, leveraged these networks to channel young Bangladeshis into TTP-aligned operations. Through madrasa circles, youth seminars, and personal mentorship, clerics like Shamin and Sayed subtly redirect loyalty from local or regional Islamist causes toward TTP, reframing Pakistan as the central target of jihad and presenting militant engagement as a moral and religious imperative.
Labor Migration as Cover A third pathway—labor migration as narrative cover—exploits socio-economic expectations to mask early recruitment. Many recruits are told they are leaving Bangladesh for legitimate employment abroad while being gradually exposed to radical ideology. Facilities such as Md. Yasin Rafi Siam alias Saifullah Guraba’s Rof Rof Hijama clinic in Khilgaon acted as informal hubs where recruits like Faisal Hossain and Ratan Dhali were first introduced to TTP-linked networks before travelling to Pakistan.
The case of Faisal Hossain from Madaripur illustrates this pathway: his family believed he was working in Dubai, but he had been ideologically groomed online by Imran Haider and Saifullah Guraba. He was subsequently killed by security forces during an operation in Karak district on 26 September 2025. Investigators also prevented at least 20 other young Bangladeshis, mostly from Khilgaon, Savar, and Mirpur, from leaving the country, highlighting how these migration narratives are used as both practical and psychological cover for indoctrination. CTTI officials have since identified approximately 100 individuals who were planning to travel to Pakistan to engage in militancy and successfully prevented their departure.
Together, these mechanisms—digital grooming, clerical mentorship, and labour migration narratives—create a seamless pathway from ideological exposure to active recruitment. Online networks spark initial interest, clerics legitimise and direct that interest into militant engagement, and socio-economic narratives provide both a cover story and logistical support for transnational movement. The repeated cases of Faisal Hossain, Zubair Ahmed, Ratan Dhali, Saifullah Guraba’s clinic-linked recruits, and the network managed by Shamin Mahfuz demonstrate how these interlinked pathways enable TTP to systematically expand its recruitment footprint in Bangladesh, transforming local grievances into cross-border militant action.
Routes of Travel
The travel routes used by Bangladeshi recruits reveal a carefully staged process that combines legal mobility with clandestine border crossings, exploiting gaps in regional border security.
Faisal Hossain and Ratan Dhali, for instance, told their families they were travelling to Dubai for work, but in reality they entered India via the Benapole Land Port in March, 2024, stayed briefly in Kolkata and Delhi, and then crossed into Pakistan through Afghanistan, where they joined TTP ranks. Zubair Ahmed took a different path: after performing Umrah in Saudi Arabia in November 2024, he did not return home but instead travelled to Afghanistan through legal channels, and was later killed in a Pakistan Army airstrike in North Waziristan on April 27, 2025, in which TTP fighters were killed. Facilitators such as Imran Haider himself travelled through Central Asia before entering Pakistan under TTP protection, demonstrating a model that blends plausible legal travel with informal cross-border networks. These routes highlight the adaptability of TTP’s recruitment logistics, using ordinary travel avenues to move recruits from Bangladesh into Pakistan
The Malaysian Precedent
The TTP pipeline is not the only evidence of Bangladeshi nationals being drawn into transnational militant networks. In June 2025, Malaysian authorities detained over 30 Bangladeshi nationals for alleged ties to militant networks. According to reports, all detainees had gone to Malaysia to work in factories or sectors like construction and services. The network recruited Bangladeshi workers and used social media and messaging platforms to spread extremist ideologies. Police intelligence revealed that the network raised funds using international fund transfer services and e-wallets to send money to the Islamic State group in Syria and Bangladesh. This case demonstrates that Bangladeshi militant recruitment extends beyond Pakistan, representing a broader regional security challenge and suggesting that the conditions enabling TTP recruitment—digital radicalization, economic vulnerability, and weak regulatory oversight—are feeding multiple transnational militant pipelines simultaneously.
Implications and State Responses
The emergence of this transnational pipeline carries security and societal consequences for both Bangladesh and Pakistan. For Bangladesh, the infiltration of young, financially vulnerable men into militant networks exposes gaps in domestic intelligence, border management, and counter-radicalization mechanisms, while also raising public concern over the deceptive methods used by recruiters, such as false employment or religious pretexts. Families like those of Faisal Hossain, Ratan Dhali, and Zubair Ahmed exemplify the human cost, as young men are lured abroad under misleading narratives and lost to militant networks.
For Pakistan, the dynamics are different but no less pressing.
The presence of foreign recruits adds complexity to ongoing counterterrorism operations, requiring intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor not only local insurgents but also externally sourced fighters with unfamiliar backgrounds, motivations, and social networks. Both states have responded through multi-agency efforts: Bangladesh's Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) and Special Branch have arrested facilitators such as Shamin Mahfuz and disrupted potential recruitment pipelines, while Pakistan continues targeted military operations—including the September 2025 raid in Karak district that killed Faisal Hossain and other operatives—alongside intelligence-led efforts to trace cross-border movements. Despite these interventions, the persistence of adaptable recruitment networks using digital platforms, Gulf staging points, and Central Asian transit corridors demonstrates the ongoing challenge for both countries: preventing radicalization at its source, while simultaneously containing the operational threat posed by foreign recruits within Pakistan's militant landscape.
Strategies to Curb the TTP’s Recruitment Pipeline in Bangladesh
Addressing this pipeline requires a coordinated, multi-layered approach spanning digital governance, legal reform, community engagement, and regional cooperation.
First, both Pakistan and Bangladesh need robust online extremism disruption and PVE/CVE strategies. Current social media monitoring is often lenient, allowing recruiters and propagandists to operate freely. Authorities must actively track extremist content on social media and encrypted platforms, counter radical narratives with credible messaging, and implement preventive programmes that reach vulnerable youth before they are drawn into militant networks.
Second, legal and institutional reforms are essential. Even a single social media post in support of terrorism should be criminalised with strict penalties. Both countries should establish single, national-level counterterrorism bodies, staffed by professional analysts rather than bureaucrats, with clear mandates for intelligence collection, analysis, and operational coordination. This would ensure consistent, expert-led responses to evolving terrorist threats.
Third, community-level interventions are equally important. Governments should collaborate with educational institutions and NGOs to establish rehabilitation and deradicalization centres, providing young people with awareness about terrorist propaganda, the false promises of militancy, and the real consequences of joining extremist groups. Early engagement and education can reduce the pool of recruits vulnerable to radicalization.
Finally, regional and international cooperation must be strengthened. Joint intelligence sharing, combined operations, and the establishment of cross-border bodies with field operators from both countries will enable timely detection of recruitment networks, coordinated action against facilitators, and a unified response to transnational threats.
Conclusion
The emergence of a Bangladeshi recruitment pipeline feeding into the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan marks a critical shift in South Asia’s militant landscape. If this trajectory is not addressed decisively, Bangladesh risks becoming a stable feeder ground for regional jihadist movements, while Pakistan faces a continuously replenished insurgency with transnational depth. Disrupting this cycle requires early intervention at the point of radicalization, legal and institutional reforms that treat extremist propaganda as a serious crime, community-based prevention efforts, and sustained intelligence cooperation between states. The Bangladeshi–TTP nexus is a warning signal: terrorism in South Asia is no longer confined by borders, and responses that remain nationally siloed will continue to fall short.
For more analyses of the TTP’s online push for Bangladeshi recruitment, discover our latest Strategic Messaging Editions:
