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About the Authors: Aamir Hayat and Muhammad Mudassir study Defense and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University. Their research focuses on transnational terrorism, terrorism financing, terrorism strategies, evolving militant tactics, and the intersection of technology and terrorism. They are Co-Founders of The Global Decipher, which covers terrorism, armed conflicts, and global security trends.
The Fractured Emirate
The Islamic Emirate of the Taliban appears to the outside world like a monolith, united by religious discipline and the return to power in August 2021. Behind this facade, however, lies a deepening fissure rooted not merely in modern political rivalries but in the historical tribal bifurcation of the Pashtun belt, specifically long-standing historical tensions between the Durranis and Ghilzais. This tribal fissure has re-emerged as a struggle between two centres of power today: an autocratic clerical court in Kandahar and a pragmatic, oligarchic network in Kabul.
While analysts generally tend to focus on external opposition to the Taliban, the more pressing pressure or threat to the regime appears to come from within. Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada seems to be undertaking a concerted campaign to transform the Taliban into a centralized vertical autocracy, moving away from the decentralized model of the former Taliban insurgency. Key features of this effort include the centralization of state finances, the establishment of a parallel security apparatus, and governance by decree that increasingly bypasses the same cabinet ministers who nominally administer the capital.
Recent developments underscore the severity of these internal tensions. In January 2025, Akhundzada reportedly warned a gathering of officials at a seminary in Kandahar that “the Emirate will collapse” if internal divisions persisted—a recording that was leaked by the BBC in January 2026. In October 2025, an apparent standoff between the two factions played out in real time: Akhundzada ordered a nationwide internet shutdown, only for Prime Minister Hasan Akhund to restore access less than 48 hours later under pressure from Kabul-based ministers. In December, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani publicly stated in Khost that a government which rules through “fear and force” is “not a real government”—a thinly veiled criticism of Akhundzada’s leadership style. In early January 2026, Akhundzada further consolidated control through a reshuffle of over 25 officials, including provincial governors, corps commanders, and senior security figures—moves that appeared designed to reinforce loyalty networks rather than improve administrative capacity.
