The Fractured Emirate: How Hibatullah Akhundzada is Reshaping the Taliban

About the Authors: Aamir Hayat and Muhammad Mudassir study Defense and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University. Their research focuses on transnational terrorism, terrorism financing, terrorism strategies, evolving militant tactics, and the intersection of technology and terrorism. They are Co-Founders of The Global Decipher, which covers terrorism, armed conflicts, and global security trends.

The Fractured Emirate

The Islamic Emirate of the Taliban appears to the outside world like a monolith, united by religious discipline and the return to power in August 2021. Behind this facade, however, lies a deepening fissure rooted not merely in modern political rivalries but in the historical tribal bifurcation of the Pashtun belt, specifically long-standing historical tensions between the Durranis and Ghilzais. This tribal fissure has re-emerged as a struggle between two centres of power today: an autocratic clerical court in Kandahar and a pragmatic, oligarchic network in Kabul.

While analysts generally tend to focus on external opposition to the Taliban, the more pressing pressure or threat to the regime appears to come from within. Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada seems to be undertaking a concerted campaign to transform the Taliban into a centralized vertical autocracy, moving away from the decentralized model of the former Taliban insurgency. Key features of this effort include the centralization of state finances, the establishment of a parallel security apparatus, and governance by decree that increasingly bypasses the same cabinet ministers who nominally administer the capital.

Recent developments underscore the severity of these internal tensions. In January 2025, Akhundzada reportedly warned a gathering of officials at a seminary in Kandahar that “the Emirate will collapse” if internal divisions persisted—a recording that was leaked by the BBC in January 2026. In October 2025, an apparent standoff between the two factions played out in real time: Akhundzada ordered a nationwide internet shutdown, only for Prime Minister Hasan Akhund to restore access less than 48 hours later under pressure from Kabul-based ministers. In December, Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani publicly stated in Khost that a government which rules through “fear and force” is “not a real government”—a thinly veiled criticism of Akhundzada’s leadership style. In early January 2026, Akhundzada further consolidated control through a reshuffle of over 25 officials, including provincial governors, corps commanders, and senior security figures—moves that appeared designed to reinforce loyalty networks rather than improve administrative capacity.

Two Talibans

The fracture is characterized by two competing governance models operating concurrently. The Kandahari faction, led by Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, is largely composed of the Durrani confederacy, in particular the Noorzai tribe, who have historically considered themselves the rightful rulers of the state. It functions according to a Quetta Shura model: a strictly vertical hierarchy in which the sole source of legitimacy is the Amir al-Mu’minin. This autocracy rests on a small group of ultraconservative clerics and endorsed figures, such as de facto Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund and Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. Notably, the Governor of Kandahar, Mullah Mohammad Shirin Akhund, is widely reported to serve as the primary gatekeeper to the Emir, limiting the access of those who might challenge his decisions.

Conversely, the Kabul faction is anchored by the Haqqani Network, affiliated with the Ghilzai confederacy (the Zadran tribe). Their model, rooted in the Miranshah Shura, is based on horizontal polycentrism, patronage and business interests rather than religious fiat. Control is exerted over the “hard power” ministries through Acting Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani and Intelligence Chief Abdul Haq Wassiq. While Acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob Omari is tribally Durrani (the son of Mullah Omar), he operationally aligns with the Kabul faction due to shared pragmatic frustrations regarding Kandahar’s interference. The structural and operational differences between these two factions are detailed in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Comparative Matrix of Taliban Factions

The Security Dilemma

Perhaps the most consequential dimension of this division is the erosion of the state’s monopoly on violence. Assessing that the ministries of defense and interior have become power bases of his rivals, Hibatullah has reportedly begun establishing his own military unit. According to one analysis, the Emir is assembling a 40,000-strong force drawn primarily from his own Noorzai tribe—a group historically socio-economically marginalized relative to the broader Durrani aristocracy. This force reportedly exists beyond the formal chain of command and could, in principle, be deployed against the Haqqani Network or Yaqoob’s forces if tensions escalate further.

This tribal sorting is physically overlaid on the structure of regional corps. Durrani (Noorzai and Ishaqzai) loyalists dominate the 205th Al-Badr Corps in Kandahar. In the southeast (Paktia), the 203rd Mansouri Corps is a de facto Haqqani stronghold with commanders appointed through the Miranshah network, giving them a buffer against Kandahar oversight. In the north, Kandahar has been actively seeking to Pashtunize the 209th Al-Fatah Corps by ousting non-Pashtun commanders—most notably former Uzbek corps commander Attaullah Omari, who was sidelined in what appeared to be an attempt to dismantle local bases of power.

Figure 1: The Geography of the Fracture.

Spying on the Spies

The conflict extends into the intelligence sphere. As Kandahar reportedly lacks confidence in the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), which remains Haqqani-dominated, it has turned to the Directorate of Supervision to monitor its own intelligence officials. Kandahar also reportedly uses special surveillance units such as the Batar and Zulfiqar units to oversee GDI directors, effectively embedding loyalists within the intelligence apparatus. Furthermore, Hibatullah appears to be attempting to nationalize the “Martyrdom Units” (suicide squads)—historically a Haqqani asset run by figures such as Taj Mir Jawad—in order to prevent their use as leverage against him.

The Economic War

The structural dissonance has also manifested as a tangible economic fracture. The conflict peaked in early 2023 over direct access to cash, resulting in the removal of Finance Minister Hidayatullah Badri (alias Gul Agha Ishakzai). On March 8, 2023, Badri was removed after he reportedly contested Hibatullah Akhundzada’s efforts to centralize control over state revenues and his direct withdrawals from the treasury for patronage networks. To neutralize him without triggering a tribal revolt among the Ishaqzais, the Emir executed a “soft purge”: on March 21, 2023, Badri was reassigned as Director of the Central Bank, effectively sidelining him from daily revenue collection.

Subsequently, Kandahar reportedly began funneling Ushr (land tax) and Zakat (charity tax) directly into accounts controlled by the Supreme Leader, bypassing the Ministry of Finance. This move was institutionalized when Hibatullah established a direct financial office in Kandahar, sidelining the Ministry of Finance from major budgetary decisions. The Kabul faction has responded to these budget cuts through a shadow economy. Sirajuddin Haqqani reportedly diverts revenues from chromite mining operations in his eastern tribal strongholds of Khost and Paktia, creating a “Black Budget” to sustain his fighters independent of Kandahar.

Implications for Regional Security

This disunity poses a paradox for Pakistan (and likely, beyond): a weakened Kabul is more difficult to negotiate with, while a fractured Taliban may prove less able to constrain the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Haqqani faction, which, as the UN Monitoring Team confirms, is under pressure from Kandahar’s attempts to strip its autonomy, views the TTP not as a liability to be managed, but as a strategic asset to leverage against Islamabad. This dynamic suggests that cross-border violence is likely to escalate as the diplomatic influence of the Kabul-based leadership continues to erode.

The consequences of this fractured dynamic were visible during the October–November 2025 Pakistan-Afghanistan border crisis, which saw Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghan territory, retaliatory Taliban attacks, and three rounds of failed mediation. Pakistan’s defense minister publicly referenced the Kabul-Kandahar split as a source of regional instability in January 2026, noting that “one faction wants to slightly open space, while the other wants to impose complete suppression.” Meanwhile, the Taliban’s trade pivot—away from Pakistan and toward Uzbekistan, Iran, and Kyrgyzstan—and the appointment of a first envoy to India since 2021, likely reflect the influence of pragmatists within the Kabul faction seeking to reduce dependence on Islamabad.

For the international community, the path to influence no longer runs through the weakened ministries in Kabul, but through the opaque shuras of Kandahar. Engagement with “pragmatists” like Mullah Yaqoob risks cultivating partners who are politically marginalized, while the real power—particularly the centralized financial control and command of the reported “Praetorian” units—consolidates in the hands of a recluse who has shown little interest in compromise.

Conclusion

The Islamic Emirate of the Taliban is not a unified state, but a coalition held together by an uneasy internal equilibrium. Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob remains the “swing vote” whose refusal to fully back the Haqqanis has thus far prevented a coup,while his unwillingness to fully support Hibatullah has staved off a complete purge. The trajectory, however, is discernible. Hibatullah Akhundzada is methodically reshaping the Emirate to secure his longevity, undermining the state’s monopoly on violence while developing parallel economies. For the international community, this fracture is critical to understand: the apparatus in Kabul may control the ministries, but the power—and the cash—flows toward a reclusive court in Kandahar.

Discover more Featured Author works here:

Some business news reads like a lullaby.

Morning Brew is the opposite.

A free daily newsletter that breaks down what’s happening in business and culture — clearly, quickly, and with enough personality to keep things interesting.

Each morning brings a sharp, easy-to-read rundown of what matters, why it matters, and what it means to you. Plus, there’s daily brain games everyone’s playing.

Business news, minus the snooze. Read by over 4 million people every morning.

Try Morning Brew for Free