The November 2025 suicide bombing outside Islamabad's District Judicial Complex—one of the deadliest civilian-targeted attacks in the capital in nearly a decade—offered a striking illustration of the fractures running through Pakistan's jihadist landscape. Jamaat ul-Ahrar (JuA) initially claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed 12 and wounded dozens. Within days, however, senior JuA commander Sarbakaf Mohmand denied the group's involvement. Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan -linked statements also publicly disassociated the alliance from the attack, underscoring the deepening fissures within Pakistan's militant ecosystem.
JuA's trajectory illustrates the dilemma facing second-tier militant groups caught between absorption and irrelevance. Founded in 2014 when Omar Khalid Khorasani split from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), JuA carried out some of the deadliest attacks of the past decade, including the 2016 Lahore Easter bombing that killed over 70 people. The group formally merged back with the TTP in August 2020—but that reintegration has increasingly appeared strained rather than consolidated.
The tensions appear to have intensified following the 2022 killing of Omar Khalid Khorasani in Afghanistan, which JuA figures have publicly attributed to internal betrayal, including allegations directed at elements within the current TTP leadership. The rift became overt in early 2025. In January, Pakistani security forces killed Qari Ismail, JuA's shadow governor for Khyber district, in an operation in the Bagh area. JuA abducted Sher Muhammad Afridi, president of the local traders' association in Tirah, on suspicion that he had provided intelligence leading to Ismail's death. TTP central investigated, declared him innocent, and ordered his release — but JuA executed him along with his cousin regardless. As TTP central publicly condemned the killing as an extrajudicial act and pledged to bring those responsible before a Sharia court, JuA's response remained defiant: Sarbakaf Mohmand accused TTP leadership of abandoning its original jihadist objectives and criticised its selective targeting policies. However, TTP central had already begun sidelining JuA figures, and by 2026, TTP's new organisational structure excluded Mohmand from the political commission entirely.
JuA resumed issuing claims through its own channels, by mid-2025, expanding its independent messaging and signalling a renewed assertion of autonomy. Its regular publication, Al-Fajr, has since featured tributes to Khorasani, with space dedicated to challenging the state's "Fitna al-Khawarij" designation – a sign of how Pakistan's theological counter-narrative has shaped militant discourse, forcing groups to allocate resources to legitimacy battles.
Rather than align fully with either the TTP or the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IUM, also referred to as IMP) alliance that emerged in April 2025, JuA has adopted what has been described as a hedging policy between the two. The group maintains limited and tactical linkages with IUM—a coalition comprising the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group, Lashkar-e-Islam, and Harkat Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan—while continuing to issue separate attack claims and expand its own network. In October 2025, approximately 30 affiliates from Chitral reportedly joined JuA, suggesting the group is seeking to rebuild influence across a corridor stretching from northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa toward urban centres further south. Earlier reporting from JuA's Ghazi Media channel indicated the presence of sleeper cells in Karachi, Peshawar, and Loralai, suggesting pre-positioned infrastructure for urban operations.
This positioning likely reflects JuA's desire to weaken TTP's stronghold in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where JuA messaging indicates an intent to consolidate organisational space rather than directly challenge TTP leadership. JuA-linked affiliates also appear to have established presence on X, further indicating efforts to cultivate a distinct ideological and operational identity.
Yet JuA's independence comes at a cost. Organisational cohesion appears uneven, with formerly JuA-aligned factions—including the Qari Shakeel group from Charsadda—reportedly shifting allegiance back to the TTP. This haemorrhaging of personnel carries dual implications. While it will likely weaken JuA's operational capacity, it also enhances the ability of rival organisations to access areas where JuA once played a gatekeeping role, particularly in urban centres of Punjab and Sindh. The TTP's parallel expansion into these provinces underscores this dynamic: between August 2023 and September 2024, the TTP announced the merger of five militant groups—three from South Punjab and two from Karachi—as part of a broader effort to reactivate "Punjabi Taliban" networks that had atrophied after 2014. The group has since claimed numerous attacks in Punjab, concentrated in Lahore, Mianwali, and Dera Ghazi Khan, while maintaining a limited but strategic presence in Sindh.
The pattern suggests that militant capabilities, rather than disappearing, are being redistributed across the broader insurgent ecosystem. For policymakers, this organisational fluidity poses a challenge: tracking threats requires monitoring not just groups, but the constant renegotiation of alliances, branding, and personnel flows between them.
For detailed analysis, see our full Strategic Messaging January 2026 issue.
